Part II (Pars Prima Secundae) Part 92 (2/2)
Reply Obj. 3: Moral matters do not receive their species from the last end, but from their proximate ends: and these, although they be infinite in number, are not infinite in species.
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SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 60, Art. 2]
Whether Moral Virtues About Operations Are Different from Those That Are About Pa.s.sions?
Objection 1: It would seem that moral virtues are not divided into those which are about operations and those which are about pa.s.sions.
For the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3) that moral virtue is ”an operative habit whereby we do what is best in matters of pleasure or sorrow.” Now pleasure and sorrow are pa.s.sions, as stated above (Q.
31, A. 1; Q. 35, A. 1). Therefore the same virtue which is about pa.s.sions is also about operations, since it is an operative habit.
Obj. 2: Further, the pa.s.sions are principles of external action. If therefore some virtues regulate the pa.s.sions, they must, as a consequence, regulate operations also. Therefore the same moral virtues are about both pa.s.sions and operations.
Obj. 3: Further, the sensitive appet.i.te is moved well or ill towards every external operation. Now movements of the sensitive appet.i.te are pa.s.sions. Therefore the same virtues that are about operations are also about pa.s.sions.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher reckons justice to be about operations; and temperance, fort.i.tude and gentleness, about pa.s.sions (Ethic. ii, 3, 7; v, 1, seqq.).
_I answer that,_ Operation and pa.s.sion stand in a twofold relation to virtue. First, as its effects; and in this way every moral virtue has some good operations as its product; and a certain pleasure or sorrow which are pa.s.sions, as stated above (Q. 59, A. 4, ad 1).
Secondly, operation may be compared to moral virtue as the matter about which virtue is concerned: and in this sense those moral virtues which are about operations must needs differ from those which are about pa.s.sions. The reason for this is that good and evil, in certain operations, are taken from the very nature of those operations, no matter how man may be affected towards them: viz. in so far as good and evil in them depend on their being commensurate with someone else. In operations of this kind there needs to be some power to regulate the operations in themselves: such are buying and selling, and all such operations in which there is an element of something due or undue to another. For this reason justice and its parts are properly about operations as their proper matter. On the other hand, in some operations, good and evil depend only on commensuration with the agent. Consequently good and evil in these operations depend on the way in which man is affected to them. And for this reason in such like operations virtue must needs be chiefly about internal emotions which are called the pa.s.sions of the soul, as is evidently the case with temperance, fort.i.tude and the like.
It happens, however, in operations which are directed to another, that the good of virtue is overlooked by reason of some inordinate pa.s.sion of the soul. In such cases justice is destroyed in so far as the due measure of the external act is destroyed: while some other virtue is destroyed in so far as the internal pa.s.sions exceed their due measure. Thus when through anger, one man strikes another, justice is destroyed in the undue blow; while gentleness is destroyed by the immoderate anger. The same may be clearly applied to other virtues.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. For the first considers operations as the effect of virtue, while the other two consider operation and pa.s.sion as concurring in the same effect. But in some cases virtue is chiefly about operations, in others, about pa.s.sions, for the reason given above.
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THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 60, Art. 3]
Whether There Is Only One Moral Virtue About Operations?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is but one moral virtue about operations. Because the rect.i.tude of all external operations seems to belong to justice. Now justice is but one virtue. Therefore there is but one virtue about operations.
Obj. 2: Further, those operations seem to differ most, which are directed on the one side to the good of the individual, and on the other to the good of the many. But this diversity does not cause diversity among the moral virtues: for the Philosopher says (Ethic.
v, 1) that legal justice, which directs human acts to the common good, does not differ, save logically, from the virtue which directs a man's actions to one man only. Therefore diversity of operations does not cause a diversity of moral virtues.
Obj. 3: Further, if there are various moral virtues about various operations, diversity of moral virtues would needs follow diversity of operations. But this is clearly untrue: for it is the function of justice to establish rect.i.tude in various kinds of commutations, and again in distributions, as is set down in _Ethic._ v, 2. Therefore there are not different virtues about different operations.
_On the contrary,_ Religion is a moral virtue distinct from piety, both of which are about operations.
_I answer that,_ All the moral virtues that are about operations agree in one general notion of justice, which is in respect of something due to another: but they differ in respect of various special notions. The reason for this is that in external operations, the order of reason is established, as we have stated (A. 2), not according as how man is affected towards such operations, but according to the becomingness of the thing itself; from which becomingness we derive the notion of something due which is the formal aspect of justice: for, seemingly, it pertains to justice that a man give another his due. Wherefore all such virtues as are about operations, bear, in some way, the character of justice. But the thing due is not of the same kind in all these virtues: for something is due to an equal in one way, to a superior, in another way, to an inferior, in yet another; and the nature of a debt differs according as it arises from a contract, a promise, or a favor already conferred. And corresponding to these various kinds of debt there are various virtues: e.g. _Religion_ whereby we pay our debt to G.o.d; _Piety,_ whereby we pay our debt to our parents or to our country; _Grat.i.tude,_ whereby we pay our debt to our benefactors, and so forth.
Reply Obj. 1: Justice properly so called is one special virtue, whose object is the perfect due, which can be paid in the equivalent. But the name of justice is extended also to all cases in which something due is rendered: in this sense it is not as a special virtue.
Reply Obj. 2: That justice which seeks the common good is another virtue from that which is directed to the private good of an individual: wherefore common right differs from private right; and Tully (De Inv. ii) reckons as a special virtue, piety which directs man to the good of his country. But that justice which directs man to the common good is a general virtue through its act of command: since it directs all the acts of the virtues to its own end, viz. the common good. And the virtues, in so far as they are commanded by that justice, receive the name of justice: so that virtue does not differ, save logically, from legal justice; just as there is only a logical difference between a virtue that is active of itself, and a virtue that is active through the command of another virtue.
Reply Obj. 3: There is the same kind of due in all the operations belonging to special justice. Consequently, there is the same virtue of justice, especially in regard to commutations. For it may be that distributive justice is of another species from commutative justice; but about this we shall inquire later on (II-II, Q. 61, A. 1).
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