Part II (Pars Prima Secundae) Part 93 (1/2)
FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 60, Art. 4]
Whether There Are Different Moral Virtues About Different Pa.s.sions?
Objection 1: It would seem that there are not different moral virtues about different pa.s.sions. For there is but one habit about things that concur in their source and end: as is evident especially in the case of sciences. But the pa.s.sions all concur in one source, viz.
love; and they all terminate in the same end, viz. joy or sorrow, as we stated above (Q. 25, AA. 1, 2, 4; Q. 27, A. 4). Therefore there is but one moral virtue about all the pa.s.sions.
Obj. 2: Further, if there were different moral virtues about different pa.s.sions, it would follow that there are as many moral virtues as pa.s.sions. But this clearly is not the case: since there is one moral virtue about contrary pa.s.sions; namely, fort.i.tude, about fear and daring; temperance, about pleasure and sorrow. Therefore there is no need for different moral virtues about different pa.s.sions.
Obj. 3: Further, love, desire, and pleasure are pa.s.sions of different species, as stated above (Q. 23, A. 4). Now there is but one virtue about all these three, viz. temperance. Therefore there are not different moral virtues about different pa.s.sions.
_On the contrary,_ Fort.i.tude is about fear and daring; temperance about desire; meekness about anger; as stated in _Ethic._ iii, 6, 10; iv, 5.
_I answer that,_ It cannot be said that there is only one moral virtue about all the pa.s.sions: since some pa.s.sions are not in the same power as other pa.s.sions; for some belong to the irascible, others to the concupiscible faculty, as stated above (Q. 23, A. 1).
On the other hand, neither does every diversity of pa.s.sions necessarily suffice for a diversity of moral virtues. First, because some pa.s.sions are in contrary opposition to one another, such as joy and sorrow, fear and daring, and so on. About such pa.s.sions as are thus in opposition to one another there must needs be one same virtue. Because, since moral virtue consists in a kind of mean, the mean in contrary pa.s.sions stands in the same ratio to both, even as in the natural order there is but one mean between contraries, e.g.
between black and white. Secondly, because there are different pa.s.sions contradicting reason in the same manner, e.g. by impelling to that which is contrary to reason, or by withdrawing from that which is in accord with reason. Wherefore the different pa.s.sions of the concupiscible faculty do not require different moral virtues, because their movements follow one another in a certain order, as being directed to the one same thing, viz. the attainment of some good or the avoidance of some evil: thus from love proceeds desire, and from desire we arrive at pleasure; and it is the same with the opposite pa.s.sions, for hatred leads to avoidance or dislike, and this leads to sorrow. On the other hand, the irascible pa.s.sions are not all of one order, but are directed to different things: for daring and fear are about some great danger; hope and despair are about some difficult good; while anger seeks to overcome something contrary which has wrought harm. Consequently there are different virtues about such like pa.s.sions: e.g. temperance, about the concupiscible pa.s.sions; fort.i.tude, about fear and daring; magnanimity, about hope and despair; meekness, about anger.
Reply Obj. 1: All the pa.s.sions concur in one common principle and end; but not in one proper principle or end: and so this does not suffice for the unity of moral virtue.
Reply Obj. 2: Just as in the natural order the same principle causes movement from one extreme and movement towards the other; and as in the intellectual order contraries have one common ratio; so too between contrary pa.s.sions there is but one moral virtue, which, like a second nature, consents to reason's dictates.
Reply Obj. 3: Those three pa.s.sions are directed to the same object in a certain order, as stated above: and so they belong to the same virtue.
________________________
FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 60, Art. 5]
Whether the Moral Virtues Differ in Point of the Various Objects of the Pa.s.sions?
Objection 1: It would seem that the moral virtues do not differ according to the objects of the pa.s.sions. For just as there are objects of pa.s.sions, so are there objects of operations. Now those moral virtues that are about operations, do not differ according to the objects of those operations: for the buying and selling either of a house or of a horse belong to the one same virtue of justice.
Therefore neither do those moral virtues that are about pa.s.sions differ according to the objects of those pa.s.sions.
Obj. 2: Further, the pa.s.sions are acts or movements of the sensitive appet.i.te. Now it needs a greater difference to differentiate habits than acts. Hence diverse objects which do not diversify the species of pa.s.sions, do not diversify the species of moral virtue: so that there is but one moral virtue about all objects of pleasure, and the same applies to the other pa.s.sions.
Obj. 3: Further, more or less do not change a species. Now various objects of pleasure differ only by reason of being more or less pleasurable. Therefore all objects of pleasure belong to one species of virtue: and for the same reason so do all fearful objects, and the same applies to others. Therefore moral virtue is not diversified according to the objects of the pa.s.sions.
Obj. 4: Further, virtue hinders evil, even as it produces good. But there are various virtues about the desires for good things: thus temperance is about desires for the pleasure of touch, and _eutrapelia_ about pleasures in games. Therefore there should be different virtues about fears of evils.
_On the contrary,_ Chast.i.ty is about s.e.xual pleasures, abstinence about pleasures of the table, and _eutrapelia_ about pleasures in games.
_I answer that,_ The perfection of a virtue depends on the reason; whereas the perfection of a pa.s.sion depends on the sensitive appet.i.te. Consequently virtues must needs be differentiated according to their relation to reason, but the pa.s.sions according to their relation to the appet.i.te. Hence the objects of the pa.s.sions, according as they are variously related to the sensitive appet.i.te, cause the different species of pa.s.sions: while, according as they are related to reason, they cause the different species of virtues. Now the movement of reason is not the same as that of the sensitive appet.i.te. Wherefore nothing hinders a difference of objects from causing diversity of pa.s.sions, without causing diversity of virtues, as when one virtue is about several pa.s.sions, as stated above (A. 4); and again, a difference of objects from causing different virtues, without causing a difference of pa.s.sions, since several virtues are directed about one pa.s.sion, e.g. pleasure.
And because diverse pa.s.sions belonging to diverse powers, always belong to diverse virtues, as stated above (A. 4); therefore a difference of objects that corresponds to a difference of powers always causes a specific difference of virtues--for instance the difference between that which is good absolutely speaking, and that which is good and difficult to obtain. Moreover since the reason rules man's lower powers in a certain order, and even extends to outward things; hence, one single object of the pa.s.sions, according as it is apprehended by sense, imagination, or reason, and again, according as it belongs to the soul, body, or external things, has various relations to reason, and consequently is of a nature to cause a difference of virtues. Consequently man's good which is the object of love, desire and pleasure, may be taken as referred either to a bodily sense, or to the inner apprehension of the mind: and this same good may be directed to man's good in himself, either in his body or in his soul, or to man's good in relation to other men. And every such difference, being differently related to reason, differentiates virtues.
Accordingly, if we take a good, and it be something discerned by the sense of touch, and something pertaining to the upkeep of human life either in the individual or in the species, such as the pleasures of the table or of s.e.xual intercourse, it will belong to the virtue of _temperance._ As regards the pleasures of the other senses, they are not intense, and so do not present much difficulty to the reason: hence there is no virtue corresponding to them; for virtue, ”like art, is about difficult things” (Ethic. ii, 3).
On the other hand, good discerned not by the senses, but by an inner power, and belonging to man in himself, is like money and honor; the former, by its very nature, being employable for the good of the body, while the latter is based on the apprehension of the mind.
These goods again may be considered either absolutely, in which way they concern the concupiscible faculty, or as being difficult to obtain, in which way they belong to the irascible part: which distinction, however, has no place in pleasurable objects of touch; since such are of base condition, and are becoming to man in so far as he has something in common with irrational animals. Accordingly in reference to money considered as a good absolutely, as an object of desire, pleasure, or love, there is _liberality_: but if we consider this good as difficult to get, and as being the object of our hope, there is _magnificence_ [*_megaloprepeia_]. With regard to that good which we call honor, taken absolutely, as the object of love, we have a virtue called _philotimia,_ i.e. _love of honor_: while if we consider it as hard to attain, and as an object of hope, then we have _magnanimity._ Wherefore liberality and _philotimia_ seem to be in the concupiscible part, while magnificence and magnanimity are in the irascible.
As regards man's good in relation to other men, it does not seem hard to obtain, but is considered absolutely, as the object of the concupiscible pa.s.sions. This good may be pleasurable to a man in his behavior towards another either in some serious matter, in actions, to wit, that are directed by reason to a due end, or in playful actions, viz. that are done for mere pleasure, and which do not stand in the same relation to reason as the former. Now one man behaves towards another in serious matters, in two ways. First, as being pleasant in his regard, by becoming speech and deeds: and this belongs to a virtue which Aristotle (Ethic. ii, 7) calls ”friends.h.i.+p”