Part II (Pars Prima Secundae) Part 94 (1/2)
Reply Obj. 2: The theological virtues are above man, as stated above (Q. 58, A. 3, ad 3). Hence they should properly be called not human, but ”super-human” or G.o.dlike virtues.
Reply Obj. 3: Although the intellectual virtues, except in prudence, rank before the moral virtues, in the point of their subject, they do not rank before them as virtues; for a virtue, as such, regards good, which is the object of the appet.i.te.
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SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 61, Art. 5]
Whether There Are Four Cardinal Virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that there are not four cardinal virtues.
For prudence is the directing principle of the other moral virtues, as is clear from what has been said above (Q. 58, A. 4). But that which directs other things ranks before them. Therefore prudence alone is a princ.i.p.al virtue.
Obj. 2: Further, the princ.i.p.al virtues are, in a way, moral virtues.
Now we are directed to moral works both by the practical reason, and by a right appet.i.te, as stated in _Ethic._ vi, 2. Therefore there are only two cardinal virtues.
Obj. 3: Further, even among the other virtues one ranks higher than another. But in order that a virtue be princ.i.p.al, it needs not to rank above all the others, but above some. Therefore it seems that there are many more princ.i.p.al virtues.
_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. ii): ”The entire structure of good works is built on four virtues.”
_I answer that,_ Things may be numbered either in respect of their formal principles, or according to the subjects in which they are: and either way we find that there are four cardinal virtues.
For the formal principle of the virtue of which we speak now is good as defined by reason; which good is considered in two ways. First, as existing in the very act of reason: and thus we have one princ.i.p.al virtue, called ”Prudence.” Secondly, according as the reason puts its order into something else; either into operations, and then we have ”Justice”; or into pa.s.sions, and then we need two virtues. For the need of putting the order of reason into the pa.s.sions is due to their thwarting reason: and this occurs in two ways. First, by the pa.s.sions inciting to something against reason, and then the pa.s.sions need a curb, which we call ”Temperance.” Secondly, by the pa.s.sions withdrawing us from following the dictate of reason, e.g. through fear of danger or toil: and then man needs to be strengthened for that which reason dictates, lest he turn back; and to this end there is ”Fort.i.tude.”
In like manner, we find the same number if we consider the subjects of virtue. For there are four subjects of the virtue we speak of now: viz. the power which is rational in its essence, and this is perfected by ”Prudence”; and that which is rational by partic.i.p.ation, and is threefold, the will, subject of ”Justice,” the concupiscible faculty, subject of ”Temperance,” and the irascible faculty, subject of ”Fort.i.tude.”
Reply Obj. 1: Prudence is the princ.i.p.al of all the virtues simply.
The others are princ.i.p.al, each in its own genus.
Reply Obj. 2: That part of the soul which is rational by partic.i.p.ation is threefold, as stated above.
Reply Obj. 3: All the other virtues among which one ranks before another, are reducible to the above four, both as to the subject and as to the formal principle.
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THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 61, Art. 3]
Whether Any Other Virtues Should Be Called Princ.i.p.al Rather Than These?
Objection 1: It would seem that other virtues should be called princ.i.p.al rather than these. For, seemingly, the greatest is the princ.i.p.al in any genus. Now ”magnanimity has a great influence on all the virtues” (Ethic. iv, 3). Therefore magnanimity should more than any be called a princ.i.p.al virtue.
Obj. 2: Further, that which strengthens the other virtues should above all be called a princ.i.p.al virtue. But such is humility: for Gregory says (Hom. iv in Ev.) that ”he who gathers the other virtues without humility is as one who carries straw against the wind.”
Therefore humility seems above all to be a princ.i.p.al virtue.
Obj. 3: Further, that which is most perfect seems to be princ.i.p.al.
But this applies to patience, according to James 1:4: ”Patience hath a perfect work.” Therefore patience should be reckoned a princ.i.p.al virtue.
_On the contrary,_ Cicero reduces all other virtues to these four (De Invent. Rhet. ii).
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), these four are reckoned as cardinal virtues, in respect of the four formal principles of virtue as we understand it now. These principles are found chiefly in certain acts and pa.s.sions. Thus the good which exists in the act of reason, is found chiefly in reason's command, but not in its counsel or its judgment, as stated above (Q. 57, A. 6). Again, good as defined by reason and put into our operations as something right and due, is found chiefly in commutations and distributions in respect of another person, and on a basis of equality. The good of curbing the pa.s.sions is found chiefly in those pa.s.sions which are most difficult to curb, viz. in the pleasures of touch. The good of being firm in holding to the good defined by reason, against the impulse of pa.s.sion, is found chiefly in perils of death, which are most difficult to withstand.
Accordingly the above four virtues may be considered in two ways.
First, in respect of their common formal principles. In this way they are called princ.i.p.al, being general, as it were, in comparison with all the virtues: so that, for instance, any virtue that causes good in reason's act of consideration, may be called prudence; every virtue that causes the good of right and due in operation, be called justice; every virtue that curbs and represses the pa.s.sions, be called temperance; and every virtue that strengthens the mind against any pa.s.sions whatever, be called fort.i.tude. Many, both holy doctors, as also philosophers, speak about these virtues in this sense: and in this way the other virtues are contained under them. Wherefore all the objections fail.