Part II (Pars Prima Secundae) Part 95 (1/2)
Again, since man by his nature is a social [*See above note on Chrysostom] animal, these virtues, in so far as they are in him according to the condition of his nature, are called ”social”
virtues; since it is by reason of them that man behaves himself well in the conduct of human affairs. It is in this sense that we have been speaking of these virtues until now.
But since it behooves a man to do his utmost to strive onward even to Divine things, as even the Philosopher declares in _Ethic._ x, 7, and as Scripture often admonishes us--for instance: ”Be ye ... perfect, as your heavenly Father is perfect” (Matt. 5:48), we must needs place some virtues between the social or human virtues, and the exemplar virtues which are Divine. Now these virtues differ by reason of a difference of movement and term: so that some are virtues of men who are on their way and tending towards the Divine similitude; and these are called ”perfecting” virtues. Thus prudence, by contemplating the things of G.o.d, counts as nothing all things of the world, and directs all the thoughts of the soul to G.o.d alone: temperance, so far as nature allows, neglects the needs of the body; fort.i.tude prevents the soul from being afraid of neglecting the body and rising to heavenly things; and justice consists in the soul giving a whole-hearted consent to follow the way thus proposed. Besides these there are the virtues of those who have already attained to the Divine similitude: these are called the ”perfect virtues.” Thus prudence sees nought else but the things of G.o.d; temperance knows no earthly desires; fort.i.tude has no knowledge of pa.s.sion; and justice, by imitating the Divine Mind, is united thereto by an everlasting covenant. Such as the virtues attributed to the Blessed, or, in this life, to some who are at the summit of perfection.
Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher is speaking of these virtues according as they relate to human affairs; for instance, justice, about buying and selling; fort.i.tude, about fear; temperance, about desires; for in this sense it is absurd to attribute them to G.o.d.
Reply Obj. 2: Human virtues, that is to say, virtues of men living together in this world, are about the pa.s.sions. But the virtues of those who have attained to perfect bliss are without pa.s.sions. Hence Plotinus says (Cf. Macrobius, Super Somn. Scip. 1) that ”the social virtues check the pa.s.sions,” i.e. they bring them to the relative mean; ”the second kind,” viz. the perfecting virtues, ”uproot them”; ”the third kind,” viz. the perfect virtues, ”forget them; while it is impious to mention them in connection with virtues of the fourth kind,” viz. the exemplar virtues. It may also be said that here he is speaking of pa.s.sions as denoting inordinate emotions.
Reply Obj. 3: To neglect human affairs when necessity forbids is wicked; otherwise it is virtuous. Hence Cicero says a little earlier: ”Perhaps one should make allowances for those who by reason of their exceptional talents have devoted themselves to learning; as also to those who have retired from public life on account of failing health, or for some other yet weightier motive; when such men yielded to others the power and renown of authority.” This agrees with what Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 19): ”The love of truth demands a hallowed leisure; charity necessitates good works. If no one lays this burden on us we may devote ourselves to the study and contemplation of truth; but if the burden is laid on us it is to be taken up under the pressure of charity.”
Reply Obj. 4: Legal justice alone regards the common weal directly: but by commanding the other virtues it draws them all into the service of the common weal, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 1). For we must take note that it concerns the human virtues, as we understand them here, to do well not only towards the community, but also towards the parts of the community, viz. towards the household, or even towards one individual.
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QUESTION 62
OF THE THEOLOGICAL VIRTUES (In Four Articles)
We must now consider the Theological Virtues: under which head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there are any theological virtues?
(2) Whether the theological virtues are distinct from the intellectual and moral virtues?
(3) How many, and which are they?
(4) Of their order.
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FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 62, Art. 1]
Whether There Are Any Theological Virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that there are not any theological virtues. For according to _Phys._ vii, text. 17, ”virtue is the disposition of a perfect thing to that which is best: and by perfect, I mean that which is disposed according to nature.” But that which is Divine is above man's nature. Therefore the theological virtues are not virtues of a man.
Obj. 2: Further, theological virtues are quasi-Divine virtues. But the Divine virtues are exemplars, as stated above (Q. 61, A. 5), which are not in us but in G.o.d. Therefore the theological virtues are not virtues of man.
Obj. 3: Further, the theological virtues are so called because they direct us to G.o.d, Who is the first beginning and last end of all things. But by the very nature of his reason and will, man is directed to his first beginning and last end. Therefore there is no need for any habits of theological virtue, to direct the reason and will to G.o.d.
_On the contrary,_ The precepts of the Law are about acts of virtue.
Now the Divine Law contains precepts about the acts of faith, hope, and charity: for it is written (Ecclus. 2:8, seqq.): ”Ye that fear the Lord believe Him,” and again, ”hope in Him,” and again, ”love Him.” Therefore faith, hope, and charity are virtues directing us to G.o.d. Therefore they are theological virtues.
_I answer that,_ Man is perfected by virtue, for those actions whereby he is directed to happiness, as was explained above (Q. 5, A.
7). Now man's happiness is twofold, as was also stated above (Q. 5, A. 5). One is proportionate to human nature, a happiness, to wit, which man can obtain by means of his natural principles. The other is a happiness surpa.s.sing man's nature, and which man can obtain by the power of G.o.d alone, by a kind of partic.i.p.ation of the G.o.dhead, about which it is written (2 Pet. 1:4) that by Christ we are made ”partakers of the Divine nature.” And because such happiness surpa.s.ses the capacity of human nature, man's natural principles which enable him to act well according to his capacity, do not suffice to direct man to this same happiness. Hence it is necessary for man to receive from G.o.d some additional principles, whereby he may be directed to supernatural happiness, even as he is directed to his connatural end, by means of his natural principles, albeit not without Divine a.s.sistance. Such like principles are called ”theological virtues”: first, because their object is G.o.d, inasmuch as they direct us aright to G.o.d: secondly, because they are infused in us by G.o.d alone: thirdly, because these virtues are not made known to us, save by Divine revelation, contained in Holy Writ.
Reply Obj. 1: A certain nature may be ascribed to a certain thing in two ways. First, essentially: and thus these theological virtues surpa.s.s the nature of man. Secondly, by partic.i.p.ation, as kindled wood partakes of the nature of fire: and thus, after a fas.h.i.+on, man becomes a partaker of the Divine Nature, as stated above: so that these virtues are proportionate to man in respect of the Nature of which he is made a partaker.
Reply Obj. 2: These virtues are called Divine, not as though G.o.d were virtuous by reason of them, but because of them G.o.d makes us virtuous, and directs us to Himself. Hence they are not exemplar but exemplate virtues.
Reply Obj. 3: The reason and will are naturally directed to G.o.d, inasmuch as He is the beginning and end of nature, but in proportion to nature. But the reason and will, according to their nature, are not sufficiently directed to Him in so far as He is the object of supernatural happiness.
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