Part II (Pars Prima Secundae) Part 112 (1/2)
Whether Sin Is Fittingly Divided into Sin Against G.o.d, Against Oneself, and Against One's Neighbor?
Objection 1: It would seem that sin is unfittingly divided into sin against G.o.d, against one's neighbor, and against oneself. For that which is common to all sins should not be reckoned as a part in the division of sin. But it is common to all sins to be against G.o.d: for it is stated in the definition of sin that it is ”against G.o.d's law,”
as stated above (Q. 66, A. 6). Therefore sin against G.o.d should not be reckoned a part of the division of sin.
Obj. 2: Further, every division should consist of things in opposition to one another. But these three kinds of sin are not opposed to one another: for whoever sins against his neighbor, sins against himself and against G.o.d. Therefore sin is not fittingly divided into these three.
Obj. 3: Further, specification is not taken from things external. But G.o.d and our neighbor are external to us. Therefore sins are not distinguished specifically with regard to them: and consequently sin is unfittingly divided according to these three.
_On the contrary,_ Isidore (De Summo Bono), in giving the division of sins, says that ”man is said to sin against himself, against G.o.d, and against his neighbor.”
_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 71, AA. 1, 6), sin is an inordinate act. Now there should be a threefold order in man: one in relation to the rule of reason, in so far as all our actions and pa.s.sions should be commensurate with the rule of reason: another order is in relation to the rule of the Divine Law, whereby man should be directed in all things: and if man were by nature a solitary animal, this twofold order would suffice. But since man is naturally a civic and social animal, as is proved in _Polit._ i, 2, hence a third order is necessary, whereby man is directed in relation to other men among whom he has to dwell. Of these orders the second contains the first and surpa.s.ses it. For whatever things are comprised under the order of reason, are comprised under the order of G.o.d Himself. Yet some things are comprised under the order of G.o.d, which surpa.s.s the human reason, such as matters of faith, and things due to G.o.d alone. Hence he that sins in such matters, for instance, by heresy, sacrilege, or blasphemy, is said to sin against G.o.d. In like manner, the first order includes the third and surpa.s.ses it, because in all things wherein we are directed in reference to our neighbor, we need to be directed according to the order of reason.
Yet in some things we are directed according to reason, in relation to ourselves only, and not in reference to our neighbor; and when man sins in these matters, he is said to sin against himself, as is seen in the glutton, the l.u.s.tful, and the prodigal. But when man sins in matters concerning his neighbor, he is said to sin against his neighbor, as appears in the thief and murderer. Now the things whereby man is directed to G.o.d, his neighbor, and himself are diverse. Wherefore this distinction of sins is in respect of their objects, according to which the species of sins are diversified: and consequently this distinction of sins is properly one of different species of sins: because the virtues also, to which sins are opposed, differ specifically in respect of these three. For it is evident from what has been said (Q. 62, AA. 1, 2, 3) that by the theological virtues man is directed to G.o.d; by temperance and fort.i.tude, to himself; and by justice to his neighbor.
Reply Obj. 1: To sin against G.o.d is common to all sins, in so far as the order to G.o.d includes every human order; but in so far as order to G.o.d surpa.s.ses the other two orders, sin against G.o.d is a special kind of sin.
Reply Obj. 2: When several things, of which one includes another, are distinct from one another, this distinction is understood to refer, not to the part contained in another, but to that in which one goes beyond another. This may be seen in the division of numbers and figures: for a triangle is distinguished from a four-sided figure not in respect of its being contained thereby, but in respect of that in which it is surpa.s.sed thereby: and the same applies to the numbers three and four.
Reply Obj. 3: Although G.o.d and our neighbor are external to the sinner himself, they are not external to the act of sin, but are related to it as to its object.
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FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 72, Art. 5]
Whether the Division of Sins According to Their Debt of Punishment Diversifies Their Species?
Objection 1: It would seem that the division of sins according to their debt of punishment diversifies their species; for instance, when sin is divided into ”mortal” and ”venial.” For things which are infinitely apart, cannot belong to the same species, nor even to the same genus. But venial and mortal sin are infinitely apart, since temporal punishment is due to venial sin, and eternal punishment to mortal sin; and the measure of the punishment corresponds to the gravity of the fault, according to Deut. 25:2: ”According to the measure of the sin shall the measure be also of the stripes be.”
Therefore venial and mortal sins are not of the same genus, nor can they be said to belong to the same species.
Obj. 2: Further, some sins are mortal in virtue of their species [*_Ex genere,_ genus in this case denoting the species], as murder and adultery; and some are venial in virtue of their species, as in an idle word, and excessive laughter. Therefore venial and mortal sins differ specifically.
Obj. 3: Further, just as a virtuous act stands in relation to its reward, so does sin stand in relation to punishment. But the reward is the end of the virtuous act. Therefore punishment is the end of sin. Now sins differ specifically in relation to their ends, as stated above (A. 1, ad 1). Therefore they are also specifically distinct according to the debt of punishment.
_On the contrary,_ Those things that const.i.tute a species are prior to the species, e.g. specific differences. But punishment follows sin as the effect thereof. Therefore sins do not differ specifically according to the debt of punishment.
_I answer that,_ In things that differ specifically we find a twofold difference: the first causes the diversity of species, and is not to be found save in different species, e.g. ”rational” and ”irrational,”
”animate,” and ”inanimate”: the other difference is consequent to specific diversity; and though, in some cases, it may [follow from the diversity of species], yet, in others, it may be found within the same species; thus ”white” and ”black” are consequent to the specific diversity of crow and swan, and yet this difference is found within the one species of man.
We must therefore say that the difference between venial and mortal sin, or any other difference is respect of the debt of punishment, cannot be a difference const.i.tuting specific diversity. For what is accidental never const.i.tutes a species; and what is outside the agent's intention is accidental (Phys. ii, text. 50). Now it is evident that punishment is outside the intention of the sinner, wherefore it is accidentally referred to sin on the part of the sinner. Nevertheless it is referred to sin by an extrinsic principle, viz. the justice of the judge, who imposes various punishments according to the various manners of sin. Therefore the difference derived from the debt of punishment, may be consequent to the specific diversity of sins, but cannot const.i.tute it.
Now the difference between venial and mortal sin is consequent to the diversity of that inordinateness which const.i.tutes the notion of sin.
For inordinateness is twofold, one that destroys the principle of order, and another which, without destroying the principle of order, implies inordinateness in the things which follow the principle: thus, in an animal's body, the frame may be so out of order that the vital principle is destroyed; this is the inordinateness of death; while, on the other hand, saving the vital principle, there may be disorder in the bodily humors; and then there is sickness. Now the principle of the entire moral order is the last end, which stands in the same relation to matters of action, as the indemonstrable principle does to matters of speculation (Ethic. vii, 8). Therefore when the soul is so disordered by sin as to turn away from its last end, viz. G.o.d, to Whom it is united by charity, there is mortal sin; but when it is disordered without turning away from G.o.d, there is venial sin. For even as in the body, the disorder of death which results from the destruction of the principle of life, is irreparable according to nature, while the disorder of sickness can be repaired by reason of the vital principle being preserved, so it is in matters concerning the soul. Because, in speculative matters, it is impossible to convince one who errs in the principles, whereas one who errs, but retains the principles, can be brought back to the truth by means of the principles. Likewise in practical matters, he who, by sinning, turns away from his last end, if we consider the nature of his sin, falls irreparably, and therefore is said to sin mortally and to deserve eternal punishment: whereas when a man sins without turning away from G.o.d, by the very nature of his sin, his disorder can be repaired, because the principle of the order is not destroyed; wherefore he is said to sin venially, because, to wit, he does not sin so as to deserve to be punished eternally.
Reply Obj. 1: Mortal and venial sins are infinitely apart as regards what they _turn away from,_ not as regards what they _turn to,_ viz.
the object which specifies them. Hence nothing hinders the same species from including mortal and venial sins; for instance, in the species ”adultery” the first movement is a venial sin; while an idle word, which is, generally speaking, venial, may even be a mortal sin.
Reply Obj. 2: From the fact that one sin is mortal by reason of its species, and another venial by reason of its species, it follows that this difference is consequent to the specific difference of sins, not that it is the cause thereof. And this difference may be found even in things of the same species, as stated above.
Reply Obj. 3: The reward is intended by him that merits or acts virtu[ous]ly; whereas the punishment is not intended by the sinner, but, on the contrary, is against his will. Hence the comparison fails.
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