Part II (Pars Prima Secundae) Part 112 (2/2)
SIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 72, Art. 6]
Whether Sins of Commission and Omission Differ Specifically?
Objection 1: It would seem that sins of commission and omission differ specifically. For ”offense” and ”sin” are condivided with one another (Eph. 2:1), where it is written: ”When you were dead in your offenses and sins,” which words a gloss explains, saying: ”'Offenses,' by omitting to do what was commanded, and 'sins,' by doing what was forbidden.” Whence it is evident that ”offenses” here denotes sins of omission; while ”sin” denotes sins of commission.
Therefore they differ specifically, since they are contrasted with one another as different species.
Obj. 2: Further, it is essential to sin to be against G.o.d's law, for this is part of its definition, as is clear from what has been said (Q. 71, A. 6). Now in G.o.d's law, the affirmative precepts, against which is the sin of omission, are different from the negative precepts, against which is the sin of omission. Therefore sins of omission and commission differ specifically.
Obj. 3: Further, omission and commission differ as affirmation and negation. Now affirmation and negation cannot be in the same species, since negation has no species; for ”there is neither species nor difference of non-being,” as the Philosopher states (Phys. iv, text.
67). Therefore omission and commission cannot belong to the same species.
_On the contrary,_ Omission and commission are found in the same species of sin. For the covetous man both takes what belongs to others, which is a sin of commission; and gives not of his own to whom he should give, which is a sin of omission. Therefore omission and commission do not differ specifically.
_I answer that,_ There is a twofold difference in sins; a material difference and a formal difference: the material difference is to be observed in the natural species of the sinful act; while the formal difference is gathered from their relation to one proper end, which is also their proper object. Hence we find certain acts differing from one another in the material specific difference, which are nevertheless formally in the same species of sin, because they are directed to the one same end: thus strangling, stoning, and stabbing come under the one species of murder, although the actions themselves differ specifically according to the natural species. Accordingly, if we refer to the material species in sins of omission and commission, they differ specifically, using species in a broad sense, in so far as negation and privation may have a species. But if we refer to the formal species of sins of omission and commission, they do not differ specifically, because they are directed to the same end, and proceed from the same motive. For the covetous man, in order to h.o.a.rd money, both robs, and omits to give what he ought, and in like manner, the glutton, to satiate his appet.i.te, both eats too much and omits the prescribed fasts. The same applies to other sins: for in things, negation is always founded on affirmation, which, in a manner, is its cause. Hence in the physical order it comes under the same head, that fire gives forth heat, and that it does not give forth cold.
Reply Obj. 1: This division in respect of commission and omission, is not according to different formal species, but only according to material species, as stated.
Reply Obj. 2: In G.o.d's law, the necessity for various affirmative and negative precepts, was that men might be gradually led to virtue, first by abstaining from evil, being induced to this by the negative precepts, and afterwards by doing good, to which we are induced by the affirmative precepts. Wherefore the affirmative and negative precepts do not belong to different virtues, but to different degrees of virtue; and consequently they are not, of necessity, opposed to sins of different species. Moreover sin is not specified by that from which it turns away, because in this respect it is a negation or privation, but by that to which it turns, in so far as sin is an act.
Consequently sins do not differ specifically according to the various precepts of the Law.
Reply Obj. 3: This objection considers the material diversity of sins. It must be observed, however, that although, properly speaking, negation is not in a species, yet it is allotted to a species by reduction to the affirmation on which it is based.
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SEVENTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 72, Art. 7]
Whether Sins Are Fittingly Divided into Sins of Thought, Word, and Deed?
Objection 1: It would seem that sins are unfittingly divided into sins of thought, word, and deed. For Augustine (De Trin. xii, 12) describes three stages of sin, of which the first is ”when the carnal sense offers a bait,” which is the sin of thought; the second stage is reached ”when one is satisfied with the mere pleasure of thought”; and the third stage, ”when consent is given to the deed.” Now these three belong to the sin of thought. Therefore it is unfitting to reckon sin of thought as one kind of sin.
Obj. 2: Further, Gregory (Moral. iv, 25) reckons four degrees of sin; the first of which is ”a fault hidden in the heart”; the second, ”when it is done openly”; the third, ”when it is formed into a habit”; and the fourth, ”when man goes so far as to presume on G.o.d's mercy or to give himself up to despair”: where no distinction is made between sins of deed and sins of word, and two other degrees of sin are added. Therefore the first division was unfitting.
Obj. 3: Further, there can be no sin of word or deed unless there precede sin of thought. Therefore these sins do not differ specifically. Therefore they should not be condivided with one another.
_On the contrary,_ Jerome in commenting on Ezech. 43:23, says: ”The human race is subject to three kinds of sin, for when we sin, it is either by thought, or word, or deed.”
_I answer that,_ Things differ specifically in two ways: first, when each has the complete species; thus a horse and an ox differ specifically: secondly, when the diversity of species is derived from diversity of degree in generation or movement: thus the building is the complete generation of a house, while the laying of the foundations, and the setting up of the walls are incomplete species, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. x, 4); and the same can apply to the generation of animals. Accordingly sins are divided into these three, viz. sins of thought, word, and deed, not as into various complete species: for the consummation of sin is in the deed, wherefore sins of deed have the complete species; but the first beginning of sin is its foundation, as it were, in the sin of thought; the second degree is the sin of word, in so far as man is ready to break out into a declaration of his thought; while the third degree consists in the consummation of the deed. Consequently these three differ in respect of the various degrees of sin. Nevertheless it is evident that these three belong to the one complete species of sin, since they proceed from the same motive. For the angry man, through desire of vengeance, is at first disturbed in thought, then he breaks out into words of abuse, and lastly he goes on to wrongful deeds; and the same applies to l.u.s.t and to any other sin.
Reply Obj. 1: All sins of thought have the common note of secrecy, in respect of which they form one degree, which is, however, divided into three stages, viz. of cogitation, pleasure, and consent.
Reply Obj. 2: Sins of words and deed are both done openly, and for this reason Gregory (Moral. iv, 25) reckons them under one head: whereas Jerome (in commenting on Ezech. 43:23) distinguishes between them, because in sins of word there is nothing but manifestation which is intended princ.i.p.ally; while in sins of deed, it is the consummation of the inward thought which is princ.i.p.ally intended, and the outward manifestation is by way of sequel. Habit and despair are stages following the complete species of sin, even as boyhood and youth follow the complete generation of a man.
Reply Obj. 3: Sin of thought and sin of word are not distinct from the sin of deed when they are united together with it, but when each is found by itself: even as one part of a movement is not distinct from the whole movement, when the movement is continuous, but only when there is a break in the movement.
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EIGHTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 72, Art. 8]
Whether Excess and Deficiency Diversify the Species of Sins?
Objection 1: It would seem that excess and deficiency do not diversify the species of sins. For excess and deficiency differ in respect of more and less. Now ”more” and ”less” do not diversify a species. Therefore excess and deficiency do not diversify the species of sins.
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