Part II (Pars Prima Secundae) Part 113 (1/2)

Obj. 2: Further, just as sin, in matters of action, is due to straying from the rect.i.tude of reason, so falsehood, in speculative matters, is due to straying from the truth of the reality. Now the species of falsehood is not diversified by saying more or less than the reality. Therefore neither is the species of sin diversified by straying more or less from the rect.i.tude of reason.

Obj. 3: Further, ”one species cannot be made out of two,” as Porphyry declares [*Isagog.; cf. Arist. _Metaph._ i]. Now excess and deficiency are united in one sin; for some are at once illiberal and wasteful--illiberality being a sin of deficiency, and prodigality, by excess. Therefore excess and deficiency do not diversify the species of sins.

_On the contrary,_ Contraries differ specifically, for ”contrariety is a difference of form,” as stated in _Metaph._ x, text. 13, 14. Now vices that differ according to excess and deficiency are contrary to one another, as illiberality to wastefulness. Therefore they differ specifically.

_I answer that,_ While there are two things in sin, viz. the act itself and its inordinateness, in so far as sin is a departure from the order of reason and the Divine law, the species of sin is gathered, not from its inordinateness, which is outside the sinner's intention, as stated above (A. 1), but one the contrary, from the act itself as terminating in the object to which the sinner's intention is directed. Consequently wherever we find a different motive inclining the intention to sin, there will be a different species of sin. Now it is evident that the motive for sinning, in sins by excess, is not the same as the motive for sinning, in sins of deficiency; in fact, they are contrary to one another, just as the motive in the sin of intemperance is love for bodily pleasures, while the motive in the sin of insensibility is hatred of the same.

Therefore these sins not only differ specifically, but are contrary to one another.

Reply Obj. 1: Although _more_ and _less_ do not cause diversity of species, yet they are sometimes consequent to specific difference, in so far as they are the result of diversity of form; thus we may say that fire is lighter than air. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic.

viii, 1) that ”those who held that there are no different species of friends.h.i.+p, by reason of its admitting of degree, were led by insufficient proof.” In this way to exceed reason or to fall short thereof belongs to sins specifically different, in so far as they result from different motives.

Reply Obj. 2: It is not the sinner's intention to depart from reason; and so sins of excess and deficiency do not become of one kind through departing from the one rect.i.tude of reason. On the other hand, sometimes he who utters a falsehood, intends to hide the truth, wherefore in this respect, it matters not whether he tells more or less. If, however, departure from the truth be not outside the intention, it is evident that then one is moved by different causes to tell more or less; and in this respect there are different kinds of falsehood, as is evident of the _boaster,_ who exceeds in telling untruths for the sake of fame, and the _cheat,_ who tells less than the truth, in order to escape from paying his debts. This also explains how some false opinions are contrary to one another.

Reply Obj. 3: One may be prodigal and illiberal with regard to different objects: for instance one may be illiberal [*Cf. II-II, Q.

119, A. 1, ad 1] in taking what one ought not: and nothing hinders contraries from being in the same subject, in different respects.

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NINTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 72, Art. 9]

Whether Sins Differ Specifically in Respect of Different Circ.u.mstances?

Objection 1: It would seem that vices and sins differ in respect of different circ.u.mstances. For, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), ”evil results from each single defect.” Now individual defects are corruptions of individual circ.u.mstances. Therefore from the corruption of each circ.u.mstance there results a corresponding species of sin.

Obj. 2: Further, sins are human acts. But human acts sometimes take their species from circ.u.mstances, as stated above (Q. 18, A. 10).

Therefore sins differ specifically according as different circ.u.mstances are corrupted.

Obj. 3: Further, diverse species are a.s.signed to gluttony, according to the words contained in the following verse:

”Hastily, sumptuously, too much, greedily, daintily.”

Now these pertain to various circ.u.mstances, for ”hastily” means sooner than is right; ”too much,” more than is right, and so on with the others. Therefore the species of sin is diversified according to the various circ.u.mstances.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 7; iv, 1) that ”every vice sins by doing more than one ought, and when one ought not”; and in like manner as to the other circ.u.mstances. Therefore the species of sins are not diversified in this respect.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 8), wherever there is a special motive for sinning, there is a different species of sin, because the motive for sinning is the end and object of sin. Now it happens sometimes that although different circ.u.mstances are corrupted, there is but one motive: thus the illiberal man, for the same motive, takes when he ought not, where he ought not, and more than he ought, and so on with the circ.u.mstances, since he does this through an inordinate desire of h.o.a.rding money: and in such cases the corruption of different circ.u.mstances does not diversify the species of sins, but belongs to one and the same species.

Sometimes, however, the corruption of different circ.u.mstances arises from different motives: for instance that a man eat hastily, may be due to the fact that he cannot brook the delay in taking food, on account of a rapid exhaustion of the digestive humors; and that he desire too much food, may be due to a naturally strong digestion; that he desire choice meats, is due to his desire for pleasure in taking food. Hence in such matters, the corruption of different circ.u.mstances entails different species of sins.

Reply Obj. 1: Evil, as such, is a privation, and so it has different species in respect of the thing which the subject is deprived, even as other privations. But sin does not take its species from the privation or aversion, as stated above (A. 1), but from turning to the object of the act.

Reply Obj. 2: A circ.u.mstance never transfers an act from one species to another, save when there is another motive.

Reply Obj. 3: In the various species of gluttony there are various motives, as stated.

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QUESTION 73

OF THE COMPARISON OF ONE SIN WITH ANOTHER (In Ten Articles)

We must now consider the comparison of one sin with another: under which head there are ten points of inquiry: