Part III (Secunda Secundae) Part 26 (1/2)
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
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FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 17, Art. 5]
Whether Hope Is a Theological Virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that hope is not a theological virtue. For a theological virtue is one that has G.o.d for its object. Now hope has for its object not only G.o.d but also other goods which we hope to obtain from G.o.d. Therefore hope is not a theological virtue.
Obj. 2: Further, a theological virtue is not a mean between two vices, as stated above (I-II, Q. 64, A. 4). But hope is a mean between presumption and despair. Therefore hope is not a theological virtue.
Obj. 3: Further, expectation belongs to longanimity which is a species of fort.i.tude. Since, then, hope is a kind of expectation, it seems that hope is not a theological, but a moral virtue.
Obj. 4: Further, the object of hope is something arduous. But it belongs to magnanimity, which is a moral virtue, to tend to the arduous. Therefore hope is a moral, and not a theological virtue.
_On the contrary,_ Hope is enumerated (1 Cor. 13) together with faith and charity, which are theological virtues.
_I answer that,_ Since specific differences, by their very nature, divide a genus, in order to decide under what division we must place hope, we must observe whence it derives its character of virtue.
Now it has been stated above (A. 1) that hope has the character of virtue from the fact that it attains the supreme rule of human actions: and this it attains both as its first efficient cause, in as much as it leans on its a.s.sistance, and as its last final cause, in as much as it expects happiness in the enjoyment thereof. Hence it is evident that G.o.d is the princ.i.p.al object of hope, considered as a virtue. Since, then, the very idea of a theological virtue is one that has G.o.d for its object, as stated above (I-II, Q. 62, A. 1), it is evident that hope is a theological virtue.
Reply Obj. 1: Whatever else hope expects to obtain, it hopes for it in reference to G.o.d as the last end, or as the first efficient cause, as stated above (A. 4).
Reply Obj. 2: In things measured and ruled the mean consists in the measure or rule being attained; if we go beyond the rule, there is excess, if we fall short of the rule, there is deficiency. But in the rule or measure itself there is no such thing as a mean or extremes.
Now a moral virtue is concerned with things ruled by reason, and these things are its proper object; wherefore it is proper to it to follow the mean as regards its proper object. On the other hand, a theological virtue is concerned with the First Rule not ruled by another rule, and that Rule is its proper object. Wherefore it is not proper for a theological virtue, with regard to its proper object, to follow the mean, although this may happen to it accidentally with regard to something that is referred to its princ.i.p.al object. Thus faith can have no mean or extremes in the point of trusting to the First Truth, in which it is impossible to trust too much; whereas on the part of the things believed, it may have a mean and extremes; for instance one truth is a mean between two falsehoods. So too, hope has no mean or extremes, as regards its princ.i.p.al object, since it is impossible to trust too much in the Divine a.s.sistance; yet it may have a mean and extremes, as regards those things a man trusts to obtain, in so far as he either presumes above his capability, or despairs of things of which he is capable.
Reply Obj. 3: The expectation which is mentioned in the definition of hope does not imply delay, as does the expectation which belongs to longanimity. It implies a reference to the Divine a.s.sistance, whether that which we hope for be delayed or not.
Reply Obj. 4: Magnanimity tends to something arduous in the hope of obtaining something that is within one's power, wherefore its proper object is the doing of great things. On the other hand hope, as a theological virtue, regards something arduous, to be obtained by another's help, as stated above (A. 1).
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SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 17, Art. 6]
Whether Hope Is Distinct from the Other Theological Virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that hope is not distinct from the other theological virtues. For habits are distinguished by their objects, as stated above (I-II, Q. 54, A. 2). Now the object of hope is the same as of the other theological virtues. Therefore hope is not distinct from the other theological virtues.
Obj. 2: Further, in the symbol of faith, whereby we make profession of faith, we say: ”I expect the resurrection of the dead and the life of the world to come.” Now expectation of future happiness belongs to hope, as stated above (A. 5). Therefore hope is not distinct from faith.
Obj. 3: Further, by hope man tends to G.o.d. But this belongs properly to charity. Therefore hope is not distinct from charity.
_On the contrary,_ There cannot be number without distinction. Now hope is numbered with the other theological virtues: for Gregory says (Moral. i, 16) that the three virtues are faith, hope, and charity.
Therefore hope is distinct from the theological virtues.
_I answer that,_ A virtue is said to be theological from having G.o.d for the object to which it adheres. Now one may adhere to a thing in two ways: first, for its own sake; secondly, because something else is attained thereby. Accordingly charity makes us adhere to G.o.d for His own sake, uniting our minds to G.o.d by the emotion of love.
On the other hand, hope and faith make man adhere to G.o.d as to a principle wherefrom certain things accrue to us. Now we derive from G.o.d both knowledge of truth and the attainment of perfect goodness.
Accordingly faith makes us adhere to G.o.d, as the source whence we derive the knowledge of truth, since we believe that what G.o.d tells us is true: while hope makes us adhere to G.o.d, as the source whence we derive perfect goodness, i.e. in so far as, by hope, we trust to the Divine a.s.sistance for obtaining happiness.
Reply Obj. 1: G.o.d is the object of these virtues under different aspects, as stated above: and a different aspect of the object suffices for the distinction of habits, as stated above (I-II, Q. 54, A. 2).
Reply Obj. 2: Expectation is mentioned in the symbol of faith, not as though it were the proper act of faith, but because the act of hope presupposes the act of faith, as we shall state further on (A. 7).