Part III (Secunda Secundae) Part 35 (2/2)
Reply Obj. 3: Charity works formally. Now the efficacy of a form depends on the power of the agent, who instills the form, wherefore it is evident that charity is not vanity. But because it produces an infinite effect, since, by justifying the soul, it unites it to G.o.d, this proves the infinity of the Divine power, which is the author of charity.
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THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 23, Art. 3]
Whether Charity Is a Virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that charity is not a virtue. For charity is a kind of friends.h.i.+p. Now philosophers do not reckon friends.h.i.+p a virtue, as may be gathered from _Ethic._ viii, 1; nor is it numbered among the virtues whether moral or intellectual. Neither, therefore, is charity a virtue.
Obj. 2: Further, ”virtue is the ultimate limit of power” (De Coelo et Mundo i, 11). But charity is not something ultimate, this applies rather to joy and peace. Therefore it seems that charity is not a virtue, and that this should be said rather of joy and peace.
Obj. 3: Further, every virtue is an accidental habit. But charity is not an accidental habit, since it is a more excellent thing than the soul itself: whereas no accident is more excellent than its subject.
Therefore charity is not a virtue.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xi): ”Charity is a virtue which, when our affections are perfectly ordered, unites us to G.o.d, for by it we love Him.”
_I answer that,_ Human acts are good according as they are regulated by their due rule and measure. Wherefore human virtue which is the principle of all man's good acts consists in following the rule of human acts, which is twofold, as stated above (Q. 17, A. 1), viz.
human reason and G.o.d.
Consequently just as moral virtue is defined as being ”in accord with right reason,” as stated in _Ethic._ ii, 6, so too, the nature of virtue consists in attaining G.o.d, as also stated above with regard to faith, (Q. 4, A. 5) and hope (Q. 17, A. 1). Wherefore, it follows that charity is a virtue, for, since charity attains G.o.d, it unites us to G.o.d, as evidenced by the authority of Augustine quoted above.
Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher (Ethic. viii) does not deny that friends.h.i.+p is a virtue, but affirms that it is ”either a virtue or with a virtue.” For we might say that it is a moral virtue about works done in respect of another person, but under a different aspect from justice. For justice is about works done in respect of another person, under the aspect of the legal due, whereas friends.h.i.+p considers the aspect of a friendly and moral duty, or rather that of a gratuitous favor, as the Philosopher explains (Ethic. viii, 13).
Nevertheless it may be admitted that it is not a virtue distinct of itself from the other virtues. For its praiseworthiness and virtuousness are derived merely from its object, in so far, to wit, as it is based on the moral goodness of the virtues. This is evident from the fact that not every friends.h.i.+p is praiseworthy and virtuous, as in the case of friends.h.i.+p based on pleasure or utility. Wherefore friends.h.i.+p for the virtuous is something consequent to virtue rather than a virtue. Moreover there is no comparison with charity since it is not founded princ.i.p.ally on the virtue of a man, but on the goodness of G.o.d.
Reply Obj. 2: It belongs to the same virtue to love a man and to rejoice about him, since joy results from love, as stated above (I-II, Q. 25, A. 2) in the treatise on the pa.s.sions: wherefore love is reckoned a virtue, rather than joy, which is an effect of love.
And when virtue is described as being something ultimate, we mean that it is last, not in the order of effect, but in the order of excess, just as one hundred pounds exceed sixty.
Reply Obj. 3: Every accident is inferior to substance if we consider its being, since substance has being in itself, while an accident has its being in another: but considered as to its species, an accident which results from the principles of its subject is inferior to its subject, even as an effect is inferior to its cause; whereas an accident that results from a partic.i.p.ation of some higher nature is superior to its subject, in so far as it is a likeness of that higher nature, even as light is superior to the diaphanous body. In this way charity is superior to the soul, in as much as it is a partic.i.p.ation of the Holy Ghost.
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FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 23, Art. 4]
Whether Charity Is a Special Virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that charity is not a special virtue. For Jerome says: ”Let me briefly define all virtue as the charity whereby we love G.o.d” [*The reference should be to Augustine, Ep. clxvii]: and Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xv) [*De Civ. Dei xv, 22] that ”virtue is the order of love.” Now no special virtue is included in the definition of virtue in general. Therefore charity is not a special virtue.
Obj. 2: Further, that which extends to all works of virtue, cannot be a special virtue. But charity extends to all works of virtue, according to 1 Cor. 13:4: ”Charity is patient, is kind,” etc.; indeed it extends to all human actions, according to 1 Cor. 16:14: ”Let all your things be done in charity.” Therefore charity is not a special virtue.
Obj. 3: Further, the precepts of the Law refer to acts of virtue. Now Augustine says (De Perfect. Human. Just.i.t. v) that, ”Thou shalt love”
is ”a general commandment,” and ”Thou shalt not covet,” ”a general prohibition.” Therefore charity is a general virtue.
_On the contrary,_ Nothing general is enumerated together with what is special. But charity is enumerated together with special virtues, viz. hope and faith, according to 1 Cor. 13:13: ”And now there remain faith, hope, charity, these three.” Therefore charity is a special virtue.
_I answer that,_ Acts and habits are specified by their objects, as shown above (I-II, Q. 18, A. 2; I-II, Q. 54, A. 2). Now the proper object of love is the good, as stated above (I-II, Q. 27, A. 1), so that wherever there is a special aspect of good, there is a special kind of love. But the Divine good, inasmuch as it is the object of happiness, has a special aspect of good, wherefore the love of charity, which is the love of that good, is a special kind of love.
Therefore charity is a special virtue.
Reply Obj. 1: Charity is included in the definition of every virtue, not as being essentially every virtue, but because every virtue depends on it in a way, as we shall state further on (AA. 7, 8). In this way prudence is included in the definition of the moral virtues, as explained in _Ethic._ ii, vi, from the fact that they depend on prudence.
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