Part III (Secunda Secundae) Part 53 (2/2)

Reply Obj. 1: The words of Sall.u.s.t are to be understood as applying to the mercy which is a pa.s.sion unregulated by reason: for thus it impedes the counselling of reason, by making it wander from justice.

Reply Obj. 2: The Philosopher is speaking there of pity and nemesis, considered, both of them, as pa.s.sions. They are contrary to one another on the part of their respective estimation of another's evils, for which pity grieves, in so far as it esteems someone to suffer undeservedly, whereas nemesis rejoices, in so far as it esteems someone to suffer deservedly, and grieves, if things go well with the undeserving: ”both of these are praiseworthy and come from the same disposition of character” (Rhet. ii, 9). Properly speaking, however, it is envy which is opposed to pity, as we shall state further on (Q. 36, A. 3).

Reply Obj. 3: Joy and peace add nothing to the aspect of good which is the object of charity, wherefore they do not require any other virtue besides charity. But mercy regards a certain special aspect, namely the misery of the person pitied.

Reply Obj. 4: Mercy, considered as a virtue, is a moral virtue having relation to the pa.s.sions, and it is reduced to the mean called nemesis, because ”they both proceed from the same character” (Rhet.

ii, 9). Now the Philosopher proposes these means not as virtues, but as pa.s.sions, because, even as pa.s.sions, they are praiseworthy. Yet nothing prevents them from proceeding from some elective habit, in which case they a.s.sume the character of a virtue.

_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 30, Art. 4]

Whether Mercy Is the Greatest of the Virtues?

Objection 1: It would seem that mercy is the greatest of the virtues.

For the wors.h.i.+p of G.o.d seems a most virtuous act. But mercy is preferred before the wors.h.i.+p of G.o.d, according to Osee 6:6 and Matt.

12:7: ”I have desired mercy and not sacrifice.” Therefore mercy is the greatest virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, on the words of 1 Tim. 4:8: ”G.o.dliness is profitable to all things,” a gloss says: ”The sum total of a Christian's rule of life consists in mercy and G.o.dliness.” Now the Christian rule of life embraces every virtue. Therefore the sum total of all virtues is contained in mercy.

Obj. 3: Further, ”Virtue is that which makes its subject good,”

according to the Philosopher. Therefore the more a virtue makes a man like G.o.d, the better is that virtue: since man is the better for being more like G.o.d. Now this is chiefly the result of mercy, since of G.o.d is it said (Ps. 144:9) that ”His tender mercies are over all His works,” and (Luke 6:36) Our Lord said: ”Be ye ... merciful, as your Father also is merciful.” Therefore mercy is the greatest of virtues.

_On the contrary,_ The Apostle after saying (Col. 3:12): ”Put ye on ... as the elect of G.o.d ... the bowels of mercy,” etc., adds (Col. 3:14): ”Above all things have charity.” Therefore mercy is not the greatest of virtues.

_I answer that,_ A virtue may take precedence of others in two ways: first, in itself; secondly, in comparison with its subject. In itself, mercy takes precedence of other virtues, for it belongs to mercy to be bountiful to others, and, what is more, to succor others in their wants, which pertains chiefly to one who stands above. Hence mercy is accounted as being proper to G.o.d: and therein His omnipotence is declared to be chiefly manifested [*Collect, Tenth Sunday after Pentecost].

On the other hand, with regard to its subject, mercy is not the greatest virtue, unless that subject be greater than all others, surpa.s.sed by none and excelling all: since for him that has anyone above him it is better to be united to that which is above than to supply the defect of that which is beneath. [*”The quality of mercy is not strained./'Tis mightiest in the mightiest: it becomes/The throned monarch better than his crown.” Merchant of Venice, Act IV, Scene i.]. Hence, as regards man, who has G.o.d above him, charity which unites him to G.o.d, is greater than mercy, whereby he supplies the defects of his neighbor. But of all the virtues which relate to our neighbor, mercy is the greatest, even as its act surpa.s.ses all others, since it belongs to one who is higher and better to supply the defect of another, in so far as the latter is deficient.

Reply Obj. 1: We wors.h.i.+p G.o.d by external sacrifices and gifts, not for His own profit, but for that of ourselves and our neighbor. For He needs not our sacrifices, but wishes them to be offered to Him, in order to arouse our devotion and to profit our neighbor. Hence mercy, whereby we supply others' defects is a sacrifice more acceptable to Him, as conducing more directly to our neighbor's well-being, according to Heb. 13:16: ”Do not forget to do good and to impart, for by such sacrifices G.o.d's favor is obtained.”

Reply Obj. 2: The sum total of the Christian religion consists in mercy, as regards external works: but the inward love of charity, whereby we are united to G.o.d preponderates over both love and mercy for our neighbor.

Reply Obj. 3: Charity likens us to G.o.d by uniting us to Him in the bond of love: wherefore it surpa.s.ses mercy, which likens us to G.o.d as regards similarity of works.

_______________________

QUESTION 31

OF BENEFICENCE (In Four Articles)

We must now consider the outward acts or effects of charity, (1) Beneficence, (2) Almsdeeds, which are a part of beneficence, (3) Fraternal correction, which is a kind of alms.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether beneficence is an act of charity?

(2) Whether we ought to be beneficent to all?

(3) Whether we ought to be more beneficent to those who are more closely united to us?

(4) Whether beneficence is a special virtue?

<script>