Part III (Secunda Secundae) Part 94 (1/2)

Reply Obj. 5: A judge renders to each one what belongs to him, by way of command and direction, because a judge is the ”personification of justice,” and ”the sovereign is its guardian” (Ethic. v, 4). On the other hand, the subjects render to each one what belongs to him, by way of execution.

Reply Obj. 6: Just as love of G.o.d includes love of our neighbor, as stated above (Q. 25, A. 1), so too the service of G.o.d includes rendering to each one his due.

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SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 58, Art. 2]

Whether Justice Is Always Towards Another?

Objection 1: It would seem that justice is not always towards another. For the Apostle says (Rom. 3:22) that ”the justice of G.o.d is by faith of Jesus Christ.” Now faith does not concern the dealings of one man with another. Neither therefore does justice.

Obj. 2: Further, according to Augustine (De Moribus Eccl. xv), ”it belongs to justice that man should direct to the service of G.o.d his authority over the things that are subject to him.” Now the sensitive appet.i.te is subject to man, according to Gen. 4:7, where it is written: ”The l.u.s.t thereof,” viz. of sin, ”shall be under thee, and thou shalt have dominion over it.” Therefore it belongs to justice to have dominion over one's own appet.i.te: so that justice is towards oneself.

Obj. 3: Further, the justice of G.o.d is eternal. But nothing else is co-eternal with G.o.d. Therefore justice is not essentially towards another.

Obj. 4: Further, man's dealings with himself need to be rectified no less than his dealings with another. Now man's dealings are rectified by justice, according to Prov. 11:5, ”The justice of the upright shall make his way prosperous.” Therefore justice is about our dealings not only with others, but also with ourselves.

_On the contrary,_ Tully says (De Officiis i, 7) that ”the object of justice is to keep men together in society and mutual intercourse.”

Now this implies relations.h.i.+p of one man to another. Therefore justice is concerned only about our dealings with others.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 57, A. 1) since justice by its name implies equality, it denotes essentially relation to another, for a thing is equal, not to itself, but to another. And forasmuch as it belongs to justice to rectify human acts, as stated above (Q. 57, A. 1; I-II, Q. 113, A. 1) this otherness which justice demands must needs be between beings capable of action. Now actions belong to supposits [*Cf. I, Q. 29, A. 2] and wholes and, properly speaking, not to parts and forms or powers, for we do not say properly that the hand strikes, but a man with his hand, nor that heat makes a thing hot, but fire by heat, although such expressions may be employed metaphorically. Hence, justice properly speaking demands a distinction of supposits, and consequently is only in one man towards another. Nevertheless in one and the same man we may speak metaphorically of his various principles of action such as the reason, the irascible, and the concupiscible, as though they were so many agents: so that metaphorically in one and the same man there is said to be justice in so far as the reason commands the irascible and concupiscible, and these obey reason; and in general in so far as to each part of man is ascribed what is becoming to it. Hence the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 11) calls this ”metaphorical justice.”

Reply Obj. 1: The justice which faith works in us, is that whereby the unG.o.dly is justified: it consists in the due coordination of the parts of the soul, as stated above (I-II, Q. 113, A. 1) where we were treating of the justification of the unG.o.dly. Now this belongs to metaphorical justice, which may be found even in a man who lives all by himself.

This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.

Reply Obj. 3: G.o.d's justice is from eternity in respect of the eternal will and purpose (and it is chiefly in this that justice consists); although it is not eternal as regards its effect, since nothing is co-eternal with G.o.d.

Reply Obj. 4: Man's dealings with himself are sufficiently rectified by the rectification of the pa.s.sions by the other moral virtues. But his dealings with others need a special rectification, not only in relation to the agent, but also in relation to the person to whom they are directed. Hence about such dealings there is a special virtue, and this is justice.

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THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 58, Art. 3]

Whether Justice Is a Virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that justice is not a virtue. For it is written (Luke 17:10): ”When you shall have done all these things that are commanded you, say: We are unprofitable servants; we have done that which we ought to do.” Now it is not unprofitable to do a virtuous deed: for Ambrose says (De Officiis ii, 6): ”We look to a profit that is estimated not by pecuniary gain but by the acquisition of G.o.dliness.” Therefore to do what one ought to do, is not a virtuous deed. And yet it is an act of justice. Therefore justice is not a virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, that which is done of necessity, is not meritorious.

But to render to a man what belongs to him, as justice requires, is of necessity. Therefore it is not meritorious. Yet it is by virtuous actions that we gain merit. Therefore justice is not a virtue.

Obj. 3: Further, every moral virtue is about matters of action. Now those things which are wrought externally are not things concerning behavior but concerning handicraft, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. ix) [*Didot ed., viii, 8]. Therefore since it belongs to justice to produce externally a deed that is just in itself, it seems that justice is not a moral virtue.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. ii, 49) that ”the entire structure of good works is built on four virtues,” viz. temperance, prudence, fort.i.tude and justice.

_I answer that,_ A human virtue is one ”which renders a human act and man himself good” [*Ethic. ii, 6], and this can be applied to justice.

For a man's act is made good through attaining the rule of reason, which is the rule whereby human acts are regulated. Hence, since justice regulates human operations, it is evident that it renders man's operations good, and, as Tully declares (De Officiis i, 7), good men are so called chiefly from their justice, wherefore, as he says again (De Officiis i, 7) ”the l.u.s.ter of virtue appears above all in justice.”

Reply Obj. 1: When a man does what he ought, he brings no gain to the person to whom he does what he ought, but only abstains from doing him a harm. He does however profit himself, in so far as he does what he ought, spontaneously and readily, and this is to act virtuously.

Hence it is written (Wis. 8:7) that Divine wisdom ”teacheth temperance, and prudence, and justice, and fort.i.tude, which are such things as men (i.e. virtuous men) can have nothing more profitable in life.”

Reply Obj. 2: Necessity is twofold. One arises from _constraint,_ and this removes merit, since it runs counter to the will. The other arises from the obligation of a _command,_ or from the necessity of obtaining an end, when, to wit, a man is unable to achieve the end of virtue without doing some particular thing. The latter necessity does not remove merit, when a man does voluntarily that which is necessary in this way. It does however exclude the credit of supererogation, according to 1 Cor. 9:16, ”If I preach the Gospel, it is no glory to me, for a necessity lieth upon me.”