Part III (Secunda Secundae) Part 94 (2/2)
Reply Obj. 3: Justice is concerned about external things, not by making them, which pertains to art, but by using them in our dealings with other men.
_______________________
FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 58, Art. 4]
Whether Justice Is in the Will As Its Subject?
Objection 1: It would seem that justice is not in the will as its subject. For justice is sometimes called truth. But truth is not in the will, but in the intellect. Therefore justice is not in the will as its subject.
Obj. 2: Further, justice is about our dealings with others. Now it belongs to the reason to direct one thing in relation to another.
Therefore justice is not in the will as its subject but in the reason.
Obj. 3: Further, justice is not an intellectual virtue, since it is not directed to knowledge; wherefore it follows that it is a moral virtue. Now the subject of moral virtue is the faculty which is ”rational by partic.i.p.ation,” viz. the irascible and the concupiscible, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. i, 13). Therefore justice is not in the will as its subject, but in the irascible and concupiscible.
_On the contrary,_ Anselm says (De Verit. xii) that ”justice is rect.i.tude of the will observed for its own sake.”
_I answer that,_ The subject of a virtue is the power whose act that virtue aims at rectifying. Now justice does not aim at directing an act of the cognitive power, for we are not said to be just through knowing something aright. Hence the subject of justice is not the intellect or reason which is a cognitive power. But since we are said to be just through doing something aright, and because the proximate principle of action is the appet.i.tive power, justice must needs be in some appet.i.tive power as its subject.
Now the appet.i.te is twofold; namely, the will which is in the reason and the sensitive appet.i.te which follows on sensitive apprehension, and is divided into the irascible and the concupiscible, as stated in the First Part (Q. 81, A. 2). Again the act of rendering his due to each man cannot proceed from the sensitive appet.i.te, because sensitive apprehension does not go so far as to be able to consider the relation of one thing to another; but this is proper to the reason. Therefore justice cannot be in the irascible or concupiscible as its subject, but only in the will: hence the Philosopher (Ethic.
v, 1) defines justice by an act of the will, as may be seen above (A.
1).
Reply Obj. 1: Since the will is the rational appet.i.te, when the rect.i.tude of the reason which is called truth is imprinted on the will on account of its nighness to the reason, this imprint retains the name of truth; and hence it is that justice sometimes goes by the name of truth.
Reply Obj. 2: The will is borne towards its object consequently on the apprehension of reason: wherefore, since the reason directs one thing in relation to another, the will can will one thing in relation to another, and this belongs to justice.
Reply Obj. 3: Not only the irascible and concupiscible parts are _rational by partic.i.p.ation,_ but the entire _appet.i.tive_ faculty, as stated in _Ethic._ i, 13, because all appet.i.te is subject to reason.
Now the will is contained in the appet.i.tive faculty, wherefore it can be the subject of moral virtue.
_______________________
FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 58, Art. 5]
Whether Justice Is a General Virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that justice is not a general virtue. For justice is specified with the other virtues, according to Wis. 8:7, ”She teacheth temperance and prudence, and justice, and fort.i.tude.”
Now the ”general” is not specified or reckoned together with the species contained under the same ”general.” Therefore justice is not a general virtue.
Obj. 2: Further, as justice is accounted a cardinal virtue, so are temperance and fort.i.tude. Now neither temperance nor fort.i.tude is reckoned to be a general virtue. Therefore neither should justice in any way be reckoned a general virtue.
Obj. 3: Further, justice is always towards others, as stated above (A. 2). But a sin committed against one's neighbor cannot be a general sin, because it is condivided with sin committed against oneself. Therefore neither is justice a general virtue.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that ”justice is every virtue.”
_I answer that,_ Justice, as stated above (A. 2) directs man in his relations with other men. Now this may happen in two ways: first as regards his relation with individuals, secondly as regards his relations with others in general, in so far as a man who serves a community, serves all those who are included in that community.
Accordingly justice in its proper acceptation can be directed to another in both these senses. Now it is evident that all who are included in a community, stand in relation to that community as parts to a whole; while a part, as such, belongs to a whole, so that whatever is the good of a part can be directed to the good of the whole. It follows therefore that the good of any virtue, whether such virtue direct man in relation to himself, or in relation to certain other individual persons, is referable to the common good, to which justice directs: so that all acts of virtue can pertain to justice, in so far as it directs man to the common good. It is in this sense that justice is called a general virtue. And since it belongs to the law to direct to the common good, as stated above (I-II, Q. 90, A.
2), it follows that the justice which is in this way styled general, is called ”legal justice,” because thereby man is in harmony with the law which directs the acts of all the virtues to the common good.
<script>