Part III (Secunda Secundae) Part 95 (1/2)
Reply Obj. 1: Justice is specified or enumerated with the other virtues, not as a general but as a special virtue, as we shall state further on (AA. 7, 12).
Reply Obj. 2: Temperance and fort.i.tude are in the sensitive appet.i.te, viz. in the concupiscible and irascible. Now these powers are appet.i.tive of certain particular goods, even as the senses are cognitive of particulars. On the other hand justice is in the intellective appet.i.te as its subject, which can have the universal good as its object, knowledge whereof belongs to the intellect. Hence justice can be a general virtue rather than temperance or fort.i.tude.
Reply Obj. 3: Things referable to oneself are referable to another, especially in regard to the common good. Wherefore legal justice, in so far as it directs to the common good, may be called a general virtue: and in like manner injustice may be called a general sin; hence it is written (1 John 3:4) that all ”sin is iniquity.”
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SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 58, Art. 6]
Whether Justice, As a General Virtue, Is Essentially the Same As All Virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that justice, as a general virtue, is essentially the same as all virtue. For the Philosopher says (Ethic.
v, 1) that ”virtue and legal justice are the same as all virtue, but differ in their mode of being.” Now things that differ merely in their mode of being or logically do not differ essentially. Therefore justice is essentially the same as every virtue.
Obj. 2: Further, every virtue that is not essentially the same as all virtue is a part of virtue. Now the aforesaid justice, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v. 1) ”is not a part but the whole of virtue.” Therefore the aforesaid justice is essentially the same as all virtue.
Obj. 3: Further, the essence of a virtue does not change through that virtue directing its act to some higher end even as the habit of temperance remains essentially the same even though its act be directed to a Divine good. Now it belongs to legal justice that the acts of all the virtues are directed to a higher end, namely the common good of the mult.i.tude, which transcends the good of one single individual. Therefore it seems that legal justice is essentially all virtue.
Obj. 4: Further, every good of a part can be directed to the good of the whole, so that if it be not thus directed it would seem without use or purpose. But that which is in accordance with virtue cannot be so. Therefore it seems that there can be no act of any virtue, that does not belong to general justice, which directs to the common good; and so it seems that general justice is essentially the same as all virtue.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that ”many are able to be virtuous in matters affecting themselves, but are unable to be virtuous in matters relating to others,” and (Polit. iii, 2) that ”the virtue of the good man is not strictly the same as the virtue of the good citizen.” Now the virtue of a good citizen is general justice, whereby a man is directed to the common good.
Therefore general justice is not the same as virtue in general, and it is possible to have one without the other.
_I answer that,_ A thing is said to be ”general” in two ways. First, by _predication:_ thus ”animal” is general in relation to man and horse and the like: and in this sense that which is general must needs be essentially the same as the things in relation to which it is general, for the reason that the genus belongs to the essence of the species, and forms part of its definition. Secondly a thing is said to be general _virtually;_ thus a universal cause is general in relation to all its effects, the sun, for instance, in relation to all bodies that are illumined, or trans.m.u.ted by its power; and in this sense there is no need for that which is ”general” to be essentially the same as those things in relation to which it is general, since cause and effect are not essentially the same. Now it is in the latter sense that, according to what has been said (A. 5), legal justice is said to be a general virtue, in as much, to wit, as it directs the acts of the other virtues to its own end, and this is to move all the other virtues by its command; for just as charity may be called a general virtue in so far as it directs the acts of all the virtues to the Divine good, so too is legal justice, in so far as it directs the acts of all the virtues to the common good.
Accordingly, just as charity which regards the Divine good as its proper object, is a special virtue in respect of its essence, so too legal justice is a special virtue in respect of its essence, in so far as it regards the common good as its proper object. And thus it is in the sovereign princ.i.p.ally and by way of a mastercraft, while it is secondarily and administratively in his subjects.
However the name of legal justice can be given to every virtue, in so far as every virtue is directed to the common good by the aforesaid legal justice, which though special essentially is nevertheless virtually general. Speaking in this way, legal justice is essentially the same as all virtue, but differs therefrom logically: and it is in this sense that the Philosopher speaks.
Wherefore the Replies to the First and Second Objections are manifest.
Reply Obj. 3: This argument again takes legal justice for the virtue commanded by legal justice.
Reply Obj. 4: Every virtue strictly speaking directs its act to that virtue's proper end: that it should happen to be directed to a further end either always or sometimes, does not belong to that virtue considered strictly, for it needs some higher virtue to direct it to that end. Consequently there must be one supreme virtue essentially distinct from every other virtue, which directs all the virtues to the common good; and this virtue is legal justice.
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SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 58, Art. 7]
Whether There Is a Particular Besides a General Justice?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is not a particular besides a general justice. For there is nothing superfluous in the virtues, as neither is there in nature. Now general justice directs man sufficiently in all his relations with other men. Therefore there is no need for a particular justice.
Obj. 2: Further, the species of a virtue does not vary according to ”one” and ”many.” But legal justice directs one man to another in matters relating to the mult.i.tude, as shown above (AA. 5, 6).
Therefore there is not another species of justice directing one man to another in matters relating to the individual.
Obj. 3: Further, between the individual and the general public stands the household community. Consequently, if in addition to general justice there is a particular justice corresponding to the individual, for the same reason there should be a domestic justice directing man to the common good of a household: and yet this is not the case. Therefore neither should there be a particular besides a legal justice.
_On the contrary,_ Chrysostom in his commentary on Matt. 5:6, ”Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after justice,” says (Hom.
xv in Matth.): ”By justice He signifies either the general virtue, or the particular virtue which is opposed to covetousness.”
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 6), legal justice is not essentially the same as every virtue, and besides legal justice which directs man immediately to the common good, there is a need for other virtues to direct him immediately in matters relating to particular goods: and these virtues may be relative to himself or to another individual person. Accordingly, just as in addition to legal justice there is a need for particular virtues to direct man in relation to himself, such as temperance and fort.i.tude, so too besides legal justice there is need for particular justice to direct man in his relations to other individuals.