Part III (Secunda Secundae) Part 95 (2/2)
Reply Obj. 1: Legal justice does indeed direct man sufficiently in his relations towards others. As regards the common good it does so immediately, but as to the good of the individual, it does so mediately. Wherefore there is need for particular justice to direct a man immediately to the good of another individual.
Reply Obj. 2: The common good of the realm and the particular good of the individual differ not only in respect of the _many_ and the _few,_ but also under a formal aspect. For the aspect of the _common_ good differs from the aspect of the _individual_ good, even as the aspect of _whole_ differs from that of _part._ Wherefore the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 1) that ”they are wrong who maintain that the State and the home and the like differ only as many and few and not specifically.”
Reply Obj. 3: The household community, according to the Philosopher (Polit. i, 2), differs in respect of a threefold fellows.h.i.+p; namely ”of husband and wife, father and son, master and slave,” in each of which one person is, as it were, part of the other. Wherefore between such persons there is not justice simply, but a species of justice, viz. _domestic_ justice, as stated in _Ethic._ v, 6.
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EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 58, Art. 8]
Whether Particular Justice Has a Special Matter?
Objection 1: It would seem that particular justice has no special matter. Because a gloss on Gen. 2:14, ”The fourth river is Euphrates,” says: ”Euphrates signifies 'fruitful'; nor is it stated through what country it flows, because justice pertains to all the parts of the soul.” Now this would not be the case, if justice had a special matter, since every special matter belongs to a special power. Therefore particular justice has no special matter.
Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (QQ. lx.x.xiii, qu. 61) that ”the soul has four virtues whereby, in this life, it lives spiritually, viz.
temperance, prudence, fort.i.tude and justice;” and he says that ”the fourth is justice, which pervades all the virtues.” Therefore particular justice, which is one of the four cardinal virtues, has no special matter.
Obj. 3: Further, justice directs man sufficiently in matters relating to others. Now a man can be directed to others in all matters relating to this life. Therefore the matter of justice is general and not special.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher reckons (Ethic. v, 2) particular justice to be specially about those things which belong to social life.
_I answer that,_ Whatever can be rectified by reason is the matter of moral virtue, for this is defined in reference to right reason, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6). Now the reason can rectify not only the internal pa.s.sions of the soul, but also external actions, and also those external things of which man can make use.
And yet it is in respect of external actions and external things by means of which men can communicate with one another, that the relation of one man to another is to be considered; whereas it is in respect of internal pa.s.sions that we consider man's rect.i.tude in himself. Consequently, since justice is directed to others, it is not about the entire matter of moral virtue, but only about external actions and things, under a certain special aspect of the object, in so far as one man is related to another through them.
Reply Obj. 1: It is true that justice belongs essentially to one part of the soul, where it resides as in its subject; and this is the will which moves by its command all the other parts of the soul; and accordingly justice belongs to all the parts of the soul, not directly but by a kind of diffusion.
Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (I-II, Q. 61, AA. 3, 4), the cardinal virtues may be taken in two ways: first as special virtues, each having a determinate matter; secondly, as certain general modes of virtue. In this latter sense Augustine speaks in the pa.s.sage quoted: for he says that ”prudence is knowledge of what we should seek and avoid, temperance is the curb on the l.u.s.t for fleeting pleasures, fort.i.tude is strength of mind in bearing with pa.s.sing trials, justice is the love of G.o.d and our neighbor which pervades the other virtues, that is to say, is the common principle of the entire order between one man and another.”
Reply Obj. 3: A man's internal pa.s.sions which are a part of moral matter, are not in themselves directed to another man, which belongs to the specific nature of justice; yet their effects, i.e. external actions, are capable of being directed to another man. Consequently it does not follow that the matter of justice is general.
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NINTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 58, Art. 9]
Whether Justice Is About the Pa.s.sions?
Objection 1: It would seem that justice is about the pa.s.sions. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3) that ”moral virtue is about pleasure and pain.” Now pleasure or delight, and pain are pa.s.sions, as stated above [*I-II, Q. 23, A. 4; Q. 31, A. 1; Q. 35, A. 1] when we were treating of the pa.s.sions. Therefore justice, being a moral virtue, is about the pa.s.sions.
Obj. 2: Further, justice is the means of rectifying a man's operations in relation to another man. Now such like operations cannot be rectified unless the pa.s.sions be rectified, because it is owing to disorder of the pa.s.sions that there is disorder in the aforesaid operations: thus s.e.xual l.u.s.t leads to adultery, and overmuch love of money leads to theft. Therefore justice must needs be about the pa.s.sions.
Obj. 3: Further, even as particular justice is towards another person so is legal justice. Now legal justice is about the pa.s.sions, else it would not extend to all the virtues, some of which are evidently about the pa.s.sions. Therefore justice is about the pa.s.sions.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that justice is about operations.
_I answer that,_ The true answer to this question may be gathered from a twofold source. First from the subject of justice, i.e. from the will, whose movements or acts are not pa.s.sions, as stated above (I-II, Q. 22, A. 3; Q. 59, A. 4), for it is only the sensitive appet.i.te whose movements are called pa.s.sions. Hence justice is not about the pa.s.sions, as are temperance and fort.i.tude, which are in the irascible and concupiscible parts. Secondly, on he part of the matter, because justice is about man's relations with another, and we are not directed immediately to another by the internal pa.s.sions.
Therefore justice is not about the pa.s.sions.
Reply Obj. 1: Not every moral virtue is about pleasure and pain as its proper matter, since fort.i.tude is about fear and daring: but every moral virtue is directed to pleasure and pain, as to ends to be acquired, for, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 11), ”pleasure and pain are the princ.i.p.al end in respect of which we say that this is an evil, and that a good”: and in this way too they belong to justice, since ”a man is not just unless he rejoice in just actions”
(Ethic. i, 8).
Reply Obj. 2: External operations are as it were between external things, which are their matter, and internal pa.s.sions, which are their origin. Now it happens sometimes that there is a defect in one of these, without there being a defect in the other. Thus a man may steal another's property, not through the desire to have the thing, but through the will to hurt the man; or vice versa, a man may covet another's property without wis.h.i.+ng to steal it. Accordingly the directing of operations in so far as they tend towards external things, belongs to justice, but in so far as they arise from the pa.s.sions, it belongs to the other moral virtues which are about the pa.s.sions. Hence justice hinders theft of another's property, in so far as stealing is contrary to the equality that should be maintained in external things, while liberality hinders it as resulting from an immoderate desire for wealth. Since, however, external operations take their species, not from the internal pa.s.sions but from external things as being their objects, it follows that, external operations are essentially the matter of justice rather than of the other moral virtues.
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