Part III (Secunda Secundae) Part 97 (2/2)

First, with regard to himself; and thus, if he inflict an injury on himself, it may come under the head of some other kind of sin, intemperance for instance or imprudence, but not injustice; because injustice no less than justice, is always referred to another person.

Secondly, this or that man may be considered as belonging to the State as part thereof, or as belonging to G.o.d, as His creature and image; and thus a man who kills himself, does an injury not indeed to himself, but to the State and to G.o.d. Wherefore he is punished in accordance with both Divine and human law, even as the Apostle declares in respect of the fornicator (1 Cor. 3:17): ”If any man violate the temple of G.o.d, him shall G.o.d destroy.”

Reply Obj. 3: Suffering is the effect of external action. Now in the point of doing and suffering injustice, the material element is that which is done externally, considered in itself, as stated above (A. 2), and the formal and essential element is on the part of the will of agent and patient, as stated above (A. 2).

Accordingly we must reply that injustice suffered by one man and injustice done by another man always accompany one another, in the material sense. But if we speak in the formal sense a man can do an injustice with the intention of doing an injustice, and yet the other man does not suffer an injustice, because he suffers voluntarily; and on the other hand a man can suffer an injustice if he suffer an injustice against his will, while the man who does the injury unknowingly, does an injustice, not formally but only materially.

_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 59, Art. 4]

Whether Whoever Does an Injustice Sins Mortally?

Objection 1: It would seem that not everyone who does an injustice sins mortally. For venial sin is opposed to mortal sin. Now it is sometimes a venial sin to do an injury: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 8) in reference to those who act unjustly: ”Whatever they do not merely in ignorance but through ignorance is a venial matter.”

Therefore not everyone that does an injustice sins mortally.

Obj. 2: Further, he who does an injustice in a small matter, departs but slightly from the mean. Now this seems to be insignificant and should be accounted among the least of evils, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. ii, 9). Therefore not everyone that does an injustice sins mortally.

Obj. 3: Further, charity is the ”mother of all the virtues” [*Peter Lombard, Sent. iii, D. 23], and it is through being contrary thereto that a sin is called mortal. But not all the sins contrary to the other virtues are mortal. Therefore neither is it always a mortal sin to do an injustice.

_On the contrary,_ Whatever is contrary to the law of G.o.d is a mortal sin. Now whoever does an injustice does that which is contrary to the law of G.o.d, since it amounts either to theft, or to adultery, or to murder, or to something of the kind, as will be shown further on (Q.

64, seqq.). Therefore whoever does an injustice sins mortally.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 12, A. 5), when we were treating of the distinction of sins, a mortal sin is one that is contrary to charity which gives life to the soul. Now every injury inflicted on another person is of itself contrary to charity, which moves us to will the good of another. And so since injustice always consists in an injury inflicted on another person, it is evident that to do an injustice is a mortal sin according to its genus.

Reply Obj. 1: This saying of the Philosopher is to be understood as referring to ignorance of fact, which he calls ”ignorance of particular circ.u.mstances” [*Ethic. iii, 1], and which deserves pardon, and not to ignorance of the law which does not excuse: and he who does an injustice through ignorance, does no injustice except accidentally, as stated above (A. 2)

Reply Obj. 2: He who does an injustice in small matters falls short of the perfection of an unjust deed, in so far as what he does may be deemed not altogether contrary to the will of the person who suffers therefrom: for instance, if a man take an apple or some such thing from another man, in which case it is probable that the latter is not hurt or displeased.

Reply Obj. 3: The sins which are contrary to the other virtues are not always hurtful to another person, but imply a disorder affecting human pa.s.sions; hence there is no comparison.

_______________________

QUESTION 60

OF JUDGMENT (In Six Articles)

In due sequence we must consider judgment, under which head there are six points of inquiry:

(1) Whether judgment is an act of justice?

(2) Whether it is lawful to judge?

(3) Whether judgment should be based on suspicions?

(4) Whether doubts should be interpreted favorably?

(5) Whether judgment should always be given according to the written law?

(6) Whether judgment is perverted by being usurped?

_______________________

<script>