Part III (Secunda Secundae) Part 139 (2/2)

Whether a Vow Is an Act of Latria or Religion?

Objection 1: It would seem that a vow is not an act of latria or religion. Every act of virtue is matter for a vow. Now it would seem to pertain to the same virtue to promise a thing and to do it.

Therefore a vow pertains to any virtue and not to religion especially.

Obj. 2: Further, according to Tully (De Invent. ii, 53) it belongs to religion to offer G.o.d wors.h.i.+p and ceremonial rites. But he who takes a vow does not yet offer something to G.o.d, but only promises it.

Therefore, a vow is not an act of religion.

Obj. 3: Further, religious wors.h.i.+p should be offered to none but G.o.d.

But a vow is made not only to G.o.d, but also to the saints and to one's superiors, to whom religious vow obedience when they make their profession. Therefore, a vow is not an act of religion.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Isa. 19:21): ”(The Egyptians) shall wors.h.i.+p Him with sacrifices and offerings and they shall make vows to the Lord, and perform them.” Now, the wors.h.i.+p of G.o.d is properly the act of religion or latria. Therefore, a vow is an act of latria or religion.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 81, A. 1, ad 1), every act of virtue belongs to religion or latria by way of command, in so far as it is directed to the reverence of G.o.d which is the proper end of latria. Now the direction of other actions to their end belongs to the commanding virtue, not to those which are commanded. Therefore the direction of the acts of any virtue to the service of G.o.d is the proper act of latria.

Now, it is evident from what has been said above (AA. 1, 2) that a vow is a promise made to G.o.d, and that a promise is nothing else than a directing of the thing promised to the person to whom the promise is made. Hence a vow is a directing of the thing vowed to the wors.h.i.+p or service of G.o.d. And thus it is clear that to take a vow is properly an act of latria or religion.

Reply Obj. 1: The matter of a vow is sometimes the act of another virtue, as, for instance, keeping the fast or observing continency; while sometimes it is an act of religion, as offering a sacrifice or praying. But promising either of them to G.o.d belongs to religion, for the reason given above. Hence it is evident that some vows belong to religion by reason only of the promise made to G.o.d, which is the essence of a vow, while others belong thereto by reason also of the thing promised, which is the matter of the vow.

Reply Obj. 2: He who promises something gives it already in as far as he binds himself to give it: even as a thing is said to be made when its cause is made, because the effect is contained virtually in its cause. This is why we thank not only a giver, but also one who promises to give.

Reply Obj. 3: A vow is made to G.o.d alone, whereas a promise may be made to a man also: and this very promise of good, which is made to a man, may be the matter of a vow, and in so far as it is a virtuous act. This is how we are to understand vows whereby we vow something to the saints or to one's superiors: so that the promise made to the saints or to one's superiors is the matter of the vow, in so far as one vows to G.o.d to fulfil what one has promised to the saints or one's superiors.

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SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 88, Art. 6]

Whether It Is More Praiseworthy and Meritorious to Do Something in Fulfilment of a Vow, Than Without a Vow?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is more praiseworthy and meritorious to do a thing without a vow than in fulfilment of a vow.

Prosper says (De Vita Contempl. ii): ”We should abstain or fast without putting ourselves under the necessity of fasting, lest that which we are free to do be done without devotion and unwillingly.”

Now he who vows to fast puts himself under the necessity of fasting.

Therefore it would be better for him to fast without taking the vow.

Obj. 2: Further, the Apostle says (2 Cor. 9:7): ”Everyone as he hath determined in his heart, not with sadness, or of necessity: for G.o.d loveth a cheerful giver.” Now some fulfil sorrowfully what they have vowed: and this seems to be due to the necessity arising from the vow, for necessity is a cause of sorrow according to _Metaph._ v [*Ed. Did. iv, 5]. Therefore, it is better to do something without a vow, than in fulfilment of a vow.

Obj. 3: Further, a vow is necessary for the purpose of fixing the will on that which is vowed, as stated above (A. 4). But the will cannot be more fixed on a thing than when it actually does that thing. Therefore it is no better to do a thing in fulfilment of a vow than without a vow.

_On the contrary,_ A gloss on the words of Ps. 75:12, ”Vow ye and pay,” says: ”Vows are counseled to the will.” But a counsel is about none but a better good. Therefore it is better to do a deed in fulfilment of a vow than without a vow: since he that does it without a vow fulfils only one counsel, viz. the counsel to do it, whereas he that does it with a vow, fulfils two counsels, viz. the counsel to vow and the counsel to do it.

_I answer that,_ For three reasons it is better and more meritorious to do one and the same deed with a vow than without. First, because to vow, as stated above (A. 5) is an act of religion which is the chief of the moral virtues. Now the more excellent the virtue the better and more meritorious the deed. Wherefore the act of an inferior virtue is the better and more meritorious for being commanded by a superior virtue, whose act it becomes through being commanded by it, just as the act of faith or hope is better if it be commanded by charity. Hence the works of the other moral virtues (for instance, fasting, which is an act of abstinence; and being continent, which is an act of chast.i.ty) are better and more meritorious, if they be done in fulfilment of a vow, since thus they belong to the divine wors.h.i.+p, being like sacrifices to G.o.d. Wherefore Augustine says (De Virg. viii) that ”not even is virginity honorable as such, but only when it is consecrated to G.o.d, and cherished by G.o.dly continence.”

Secondly, because he that vows something and does it, subjects himself to G.o.d more than he that only does it; for he subjects himself to G.o.d not only as to the act, but also as to the power, since in future he cannot do something else. Even so he gives more who gives the tree with its fruit, than he that gives the fruit only, as Anselm [*Eadmer] observes (De Simil. viii). For this reason, we thank even those who promise, as stated above (A. 5, ad 2).

Thirdly, because a vow fixes the will on the good immovably and to do anything of a will that is fixed on the good belongs to the perfection of virtue, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 4), just as to sin with an obstinate mind aggravates the sin, and is called a sin against the Holy Ghost, as stated above (Q. 14, A. 2).

Reply Obj. 1: The pa.s.sage quoted should be understood as referring to necessity of coercion which causes an act to be involuntary and excludes devotion. Hence he says pointedly: ”Lest that which we are free to do be done without devotion and unwillingly.” On the other hand the necessity resulting from a vow is caused by the immobility of the will, wherefore it strengthens the will and increases devotion. Hence the argument does not conclude.

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