Part III (Secunda Secundae) Part 139 (1/2)
Reply Obj. 3: The mortification of one's own body, for instance by vigils and fasting, is not acceptable to G.o.d except in so far as it is an act of virtue; and this depends on its being done with due discretion, namely, that concupiscence be curbed without overburdening nature. On this condition such things may be the matter of a vow. Hence the Apostle after saying (Rom. 12:1), ”Present your bodies a living sacrifice, holy, pleasing to G.o.d,” adds, ”your reasonable service.” Since, however, man is easily mistaken in judging of matters concerning himself, such vows as these are more fittingly kept or disregarded according to the judgment of a superior, yet so that, should a man find that without doubt he is seriously burdened by keeping such a vow, and should he be unable to appeal to his superior, he ought not to keep it. As to vows about vain and useless things they should be ridiculed rather than kept.
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THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 88, Art. 3]
Whether All Vows Are Binding?
Objection 1: It would seem that vows are not all binding. For man needs things that are done by another, more than G.o.d does, since He has no need for our goods (Ps. 15:2). Now according to the prescription of human laws [*Dig. L. xii, de pollicitat., i] a simple promise made to a man is not binding; and this seems to be prescribed on account of the changeableness of the human will. Much less binding therefore is a simple promise made to G.o.d, which we call a vow.
Obj. 2: Further, no one is bound to do what is impossible. Now sometimes that which a man has vowed becomes impossible to him, either because it depends on another's decision, as when, for instance, a man vows to enter a monastery, the monks of which refuse to receive him: or on account of some defect arising, for instance when a woman vows virginity, and afterwards is deflowered; or when a man vows to give a sum of money, and afterwards loses it. Therefore a vow is not always binding.
Obj. 3: Further, if a man is bound to pay something, he must do so at once. But a man is not bound to pay his vow at once, especially if it be taken under a condition to be fulfilled in the future. Therefore a vow is not always binding.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Eccles. 5:3, 4): ”Whatsoever thou hast vowed, pay it; and it is much better not to vow, than after a vow not to perform the things promised.”
_I answer that,_ For one to be accounted faithful one must keep one's promises. Wherefore, according to Augustine [*Ep. x.x.xii, 2: De Mendac. xx] faith takes its name ”from a man's deed agreeing with his word” [*_Fides ... fiunt dicta._ Cicero gives the same etymology (De Offic. i, 7)]. Now man ought to be faithful to G.o.d above all, both on account of G.o.d's sovereignty, and on account of the favors he has received from G.o.d. Hence man is obliged before all to fulfill the vows he has made to G.o.d, since this is part of the fidelity he owes to G.o.d. On the other hand, the breaking of a vow is a kind of infidelity. Wherefore Solomon gives the reason why vows should be paid to G.o.d, because ”an unfaithful ... promise displeaseth Him”
[*Eccles. 5:3].
Reply Obj. 1: Honesty demands that a man should keep any promise he makes to another man, and this obligation is based on the natural law. But for a man to be under a civil obligation through a promise he has made, other conditions are requisite. And although G.o.d needs not our goods, we are under a very great obligation to Him: so that a vow made to Him is most binding.
Reply Obj. 2: If that which a man has vowed becomes impossible to him through any cause whatsoever, he must do what he can, so that he have at least a will ready to do what he can. Hence if a man has vowed to enter a monastery, he must endeavor to the best of his power to be received there. And if his intention was chiefly to bind himself to enter the religious life, so that, in consequence, he chose this particular form of religious life, or this place, as being most agreeable to him, he is bound, should he be unable to be received there, to enter the religious life elsewhere. But if his princ.i.p.al intention is to bind himself to this particular kind of religious life, or to this particular place, because the one or the other pleases him in some special way, he is not bound to enter another religious house, if they are unwilling to receive him into this particular one. On the other hand, if he be rendered incapable of fulfilling his vow through his own fault, he is bound over and above to do penance for his past fault: thus if a woman has vowed virginity and is afterwards violated, she is bound not only to observe what is in her power, namely, perpetual continency, but also to repent of what she has lost by sinning.
Reply Obj. 3: The obligation of a vow is caused by our own will and intention, wherefore it is written (Deut. 23:23): ”That which is once gone out of thy lips, thou shalt observe, and shalt do as thou hast promised to the Lord thy G.o.d, and hast spoken with thy own will and with thy own mouth.” Wherefore if in taking a vow, it is one's intention and will to bind oneself to fulfil it at once, one is bound to fulfil it immediately. But if one intend to fulfil it at a certain time, or under a certain condition, one is not bound to immediate fulfilment. And yet one ought not to delay longer than one intended to bind oneself, for it is written (Deut. 23:21): ”When thou hast made a vow to the Lord thy G.o.d thou shalt not delay to pay it: because the Lord thy G.o.d will require it; and if thou delay, it shall be imputed to thee for a sin.”
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FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 88, Art. 4]
Whether It Is Expedient to Take Vows?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not expedient to take vows. It is not expedient to anyone to deprive himself of the good that G.o.d has given him. Now one of the greatest goods that G.o.d has given man is liberty whereof he seems to be deprived by the necessity implicated in a vow. Therefore it would seem inexpedient for man to take vows.
Obj. 2: Further, no one should expose himself to danger. But whoever takes a vow exposes himself to danger, since that which, before taking a vow, he could omit without danger, becomes a source of danger to him if he should not fulfil it after taking the vow. Hence Augustine says (Ep. cxxvii, ad Arment. et Paulin.): ”Since thou hast vowed, thou hast bound thyself, thou canst not do otherwise. If thou dost not what thou hast vowed thou wilt not be as thou wouldst have been hadst thou not vowed. For then thou wouldst have been less great, not less good: whereas now if thou breakest faith with G.o.d (which G.o.d forbid) thou art the more unhappy, as thou wouldst have been happier, hadst thou kept thy vow.” Therefore it is not expedient to take vows.
Obj. 3: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 4:16): ”Be ye followers of me, as I also am of Christ.” But we do not read that either Christ or the Apostles took any vows. Therefore it would seem inexpedient to take vows.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 75:12): ”Vow ye and pay to the Lord your G.o.d.”
_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 1, 2), a vow is a promise made to G.o.d. Now one makes a promise to a man under one aspect, and to G.o.d under another. Because we promise something to a man for his own profit; since it profits him that we should be of service to him, and that we should at first a.s.sure him of the future fulfilment of that service: whereas we make promises to G.o.d not for His but for our own profit. Hence Augustine says (Ep. cxxvii, ad Arment. et Paulin.): ”He is a kind and not a needy exactor, for he does not grow rich on our payments, but makes those who pay Him grow rich in Him.” And just as what we give G.o.d is useful not to Him but to us, since ”what is given Him is added to the giver,” as Augustine says (Ep. cxxvii, ad Arment.
et Paulin.), so also a promise whereby we vow something to G.o.d, does not conduce to His profit, nor does He need to be a.s.sured by us, but it conduces to our profit, in so far as by vowing we fix our wills immovably on that which it is expedient to do. Hence it is expedient to take vows.
Reply Obj. 1: Even as one's liberty is not lessened by one being unable to sin, so, too, the necessity resulting from a will firmly fixed to good does not lessen the liberty, as instanced in G.o.d and the blessed. Such is the necessity implied by a vow, bearing a certain resemblance to the confirmation of the blessed. Hence, Augustine says (Ep. cxxvii, ad Arment. et Paulin.) that ”happy is the necessity that compels us to do the better things.”
Reply Obj. 2: When danger arises from the deed itself, this deed is not expedient, for instance that one cross a river by a tottering bridge: but if the danger arise through man's failure in the deed, the latter does not cease to be expedient: thus it is expedient to mount on horseback, though there be the danger of a fall from the horse: else it would behoove one to desist from all good things, that may become dangerous accidentally. Wherefore it is written (Eccles.
11:4): ”He that observeth the wind shall not sow, and he that considereth the clouds shall never reap.” Now a man incurs danger, not from the vow itself, but from his fault, when he changes his mind by breaking his vow. Hence, Augustine says (Ep. cxxvii, ad Arment. et Paulin.): ”Repent not of thy vow: thou shouldst rather rejoice that thou canst no longer do what thou mightest lawfully have done to thy detriment.”
Reply Obj. 3: It was incompetent for Christ, by His very nature, to take a vow, both because He was G.o.d, and because, as man, His will was firmly fixed on the good, since He was a _comprehensor._ By a kind of similitude, however, He is represented as saying (Ps. 21:26): ”I will pay my vows in the sight of them that fear Him,” when He is speaking of His body, which is the Church.
The apostles are understood to have vowed things pertaining to the state of perfection when ”they left all things and followed Christ.”
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FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 88, Art. 5]