Part III (Secunda Secundae) Part 179 (1/2)
Consequently the order of sins may be considered in two ways. First, on the part of the good that is despised or corrupted by sin, and then the greater the good the graver the sin. From this point of view a sin that is against G.o.d is most grievous; after this comes a sin that is committed against a man's person, and after this comes a sin against external things, which are deputed to man's use, and this seems to belong to covetousness. Secondly, the degrees of sin may be considered on the part of the good to which the human appet.i.te is inordinately subjected; and then the lesser the good, the more deformed is the sin: for it is more shameful to be subject to a lower than to a higher good. Now the good of external things is the lowest of human goods: since it is less than the good of the body, and this is less than the good of the soul, which is less than the Divine good. From this point of view the sin of covetousness, whereby the human appet.i.te is subjected even to external things, has in a way a greater deformity. Since, however, corruption or privation of good is the formal element in sin, while conversion to a mutable good is the material element, the gravity of the sin is to be judged from the point of view of the good corrupted, rather than from that of the good to which the appet.i.te is subjected. Hence we must a.s.sert that covetousness is not simply the most grievous of sins.
Reply Obj. 1: These authorities speak of covetousness on the part of the good to which the appet.i.te is subjected. Hence (Ecclus. 10:10) it is given as a reason that the covetous man ”setteth his own soul to sale”; because, to wit, he exposes his soul--that is, his life--to danger for the sake of money. Hence the text continues: ”Because while he liveth he hath cast away”--that is, despised--”his bowels,”
in order to make money. Tully also adds that it is the mark of a ”narrow mind,” namely, that one be willing to be subject to money.
Reply Obj. 2: Augustine is taking greed generally, in reference to any temporal good, not in its special acceptation for covetousness: because greed for any temporal good is the bane of charity, inasmuch as a man turns away from the Divine good through cleaving to a temporal good.
Reply Obj. 3: The sin against the Holy Ghost is incurable in one way, covetousness in another. For the sin against the Holy Ghost is incurable by reason of contempt: for instance, because a man contemns G.o.d's mercy, or His justice, or some one of those things whereby man's sins are healed: wherefore incurability of this kind points to the greater gravity of the sin. on the other hand, covetousness is incurable on the part of a human defect; a thing which human nature ever seeks to remedy, since the more deficient one is the more one seeks relief from external things, and consequently the more one gives way to covetousness. Hence incurability of this kind is an indication not of the sin being more grievous, but of its being somewhat more dangerous.
Reply Obj. 4: Covetousness is compared to idolatry on account of a certain likeness that it bears to it: because the covetous man, like the idolater, subjects himself to an external creature, though not in the same way. For the idolater subjects himself to an external creature by paying it Divine honor, whereas the covetous man subjects himself to an external creature by desiring it immoderately for use, not for wors.h.i.+p. Hence it does not follow that covetousness is as grievous a sin as idolatry.
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SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 118, Art. 6]
Whether Covetousness Is a Spiritual Sin?
Objection 1: It seems that covetousness is not a spiritual sin. For spiritual sins seem to regard spiritual goods. But the matter of covetousness is bodily goods, namely, external riches. Therefore covetousness is not a spiritual sin.
Obj. 2: Further, spiritual sin is condivided with sin of the flesh.
Now covetousness is seemingly a sin of the flesh, for it results from the corruption of the flesh, as instanced in old people who, through corruption of carnal nature, fall into covetousness. Therefore covetousness is not a spiritual sin.
Obj. 3: Further, a sin of the flesh is one by which man's body is disordered, according to the saying of the Apostle (1 Cor. 6:18), ”He that committeth fornication sinneth against his own body.” Now covetousness disturbs man even in his body; wherefore Chrysostom (Hom. xxix in Matth.) compares the covetous man to the man who was possessed by the devil (Mk. 5) and was troubled in body. Therefore covetousness seems not to be a spiritual sin.
_On the contrary,_ Gregory (Moral. x.x.xi) numbers covetousness among spiritual vices.
_I answer that,_ Sins are seated chiefly in the affections: and all the affections or pa.s.sions of the soul have their term in pleasure and sorrow, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 5). Now some pleasures are carnal and some spiritual. Carnal pleasures are those which are consummated in the carnal senses--for instance, the pleasures of the table and s.e.xual pleasures: while spiritual pleasures are those which are consummated in the mere apprehension of the soul. Accordingly, sins of the flesh are those which are consummated in carnal pleasures, while spiritual sins are consummated in pleasures of the spirit without pleasure of the flesh. Such is covetousness: for the covetous man takes pleasure in the consideration of himself as a possessor of riches. Therefore covetousness is a spiritual sin.
Reply Obj. 1: Covetousness with regard to a bodily object seeks the pleasure, not of the body but only of the soul, forasmuch as a man takes pleasure in the fact that he possesses riches: wherefore it is not a sin of the flesh. Nevertheless by reason of its object it is a mean between purely spiritual sins, which seek spiritual pleasure in respect of spiritual objects (thus pride is about excellence), and purely carnal sins, which seek a purely bodily pleasure in respect of a bodily object.
Reply Obj. 2: Movement takes its species from the term _whereto_ and not from the term _wherefrom._ Hence a vice of the flesh is so called from its tending to a pleasure of the flesh, and not from its originating in some defect of the flesh.
Reply Obj. 3: Chrysostom compares a covetous man to the man who was possessed by the devil, not that the former is troubled in the flesh in the same way as the latter, but by way of contrast, since while the possessed man, of whom we read in Mk. 5, stripped himself, the covetous man loads himself with an excess of riches.
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SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 118, Art. 7]
Whether Covetousness Is a Capital Vice?
Objection 1: It seems that covetousness is not a capital vice. For covetousness is opposed to liberality as the mean, and to prodigality as extreme. But neither is liberality a princ.i.p.al virtue, nor prodigality a capital vice. Therefore covetousness also should not be reckoned a capital vice.
Obj. 2: Further, as stated above (I-II, Q. 84, AA. 3, 4), those vices are called capital which have princ.i.p.al ends, to which the ends of other vices are directed. But this does not apply to covetousness: since riches have the aspect, not of an end, but rather of something directed to an end, as stated in _Ethic._ i, 5. Therefore covetousness is not a capital vice.
Obj. 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xv), that ”covetousness arises sometimes from pride, sometimes from fear. For there are those who, when they think that they lack the needful for their expenses, allow the mind to give way to covetousness. And there are others who, wis.h.i.+ng to be thought more of, are incited to greed for other people's property.” Therefore covetousness arises from other vices instead of being a capital vice in respect of other vices.
_On the contrary,_ Gregory (Moral. x.x.xi) reckons covetousness among the capital vices.
_I answer that,_ As stated in the Second Objection, a capital vice is one which under the aspect of end gives rise to other vices: because when an end is very desirable, the result is that through desire thereof man sets about doing many things either good or evil. Now the most desirable end is happiness or felicity, which is the last end of human life, as stated above (I-II, Q. 1, AA. 4, 7, 8): wherefore the more a thing is furnished with the conditions of happiness, the more desirable it is. Also one of the conditions of happiness is that it be self-sufficing, else it would not set man's appet.i.te at rest, as the last end does. Now riches give great promise of self-sufficiency, as Boethius says (De Consol. iii): the reason of which, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 5), is that we ”use money in token of taking possession of something,” and again it is written (Eccles.
10:19): ”All things obey money.” Therefore covetousness, which is desire for money, is a capital vice.
Reply Obj. 1: Virtue is perfected in accordance with reason, but vice is perfected in accordance with the inclination of the sensitive appet.i.te. Now reason and sensitive appet.i.te do not belong chiefly to the same genus, and consequently it does not follow that princ.i.p.al vice is opposed to princ.i.p.al virtue. Wherefore, although liberality is not a princ.i.p.al virtue, since it does not regard the princ.i.p.al good of the reason, yet covetousness is a princ.i.p.al vice, because it regards money, which occupies a princ.i.p.al place among sensible goods, for the reason given in the Article.