Part III (Secunda Secundae) Part 184 (2/2)
Secondly, a man performs an act of fort.i.tude without having the virtue, through the impulse of a pa.s.sion, whether of sorrow that he wishes to cast off, or again of anger. Thirdly, through choice, not indeed of a due end, but of some temporal advantage to be obtained, such as honor, pleasure, or gain, or of some disadvantage to be avoided, such as blame, pain, or loss.
Reply Obj. 3: The fort.i.tude of the soul which is reckoned a virtue, as explained in the Reply to the First Objection, is so called from its likeness to fort.i.tude of the body. Nor is it inconsistent with the notion of virtue, that a man should have a natural inclination to virtue by reason of his natural temperament, as stated above (I-II, Q. 63, A. 1).
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SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 123, Art. 2]
Whether Fort.i.tude Is a Special Virtue?
Objection 1: It seems that fort.i.tude is not a special virtue. For it is written (Wis. 7:7): ”She teacheth temperance, and prudence, and justice, and fort.i.tude,” where the text has ”virtue” for ”fort.i.tude.”
Since then the term ”virtue” is common to all virtues, it seems that fort.i.tude is a general virtue.
Obj. 2: Further, Ambrose says (De Offic. i): ”Fort.i.tude is not lacking in courage, for alone she defends the honor of the virtues and guards their behests. She it is that wages an inexorable war on all vice, undeterred by toil, brave in face of dangers, steeled against pleasures, unyielding to l.u.s.ts, avoiding covetousness as a deformity that weakens virtue”; and he says the same further on in connection with other vices. Now this cannot apply to any special virtue. Therefore fort.i.tude is not a special virtue.
Obj. 3: Further, fort.i.tude would seem to derive its name from firmness. But it belongs to every virtue to stand firm, as stated in _Ethic._ ii. Therefore fort.i.tude is a general virtue.
_On the contrary,_ Gregory (Moral. xxii) numbers it among the other virtues.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 61, AA. 3, 4), the term ”fort.i.tude” can be taken in two ways. First, as simply denoting a certain firmness of mind, and in this sense it is a general virtue, or rather a condition of every virtue, since as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii), it is requisite for every virtue to act firmly and immovably. Secondly, fort.i.tude may be taken to denote firmness only in bearing and withstanding those things wherein it is most difficult to be firm, namely in certain grave dangers. Therefore Tully says (Rhet. ii), that ”fort.i.tude is deliberate facing of dangers and bearing of toils.” In this sense fort.i.tude is reckoned a special virtue, because it has a special matter.
Reply Obj. 1: According to the Philosopher (De Coelo i, 116) the word virtue refers to the extreme limit of a power. Now a natural power is, in one sense, the power of resisting corruptions, and in another sense is a principle of action, as stated in _Metaph._ v, 17. And since this latter meaning is the more common, the term ”virtue,” as denoting the extreme limit of such a power, is a common term, for virtue taken in a general sense is nothing else than a habit whereby one acts well. But as denoting the extreme limit of power in the first sense, which sense is more specific, it is applied to a special virtue, namely fort.i.tude, to which it belongs to stand firm against all kinds of a.s.saults.
Reply Obj. 2: Ambrose takes fort.i.tude in a broad sense, as denoting firmness of mind in face of a.s.saults of all kinds. Nevertheless even as a special virtue with a determinate matter, it helps to resist the a.s.saults of all vices. For he that can stand firm in things that are most difficult to bear, is prepared, in consequence, to resist those which are less difficult.
Reply Obj. 3: This objection takes fort.i.tude in the first sense.
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THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 123, Art. 3]
Whether Fort.i.tude Is About Fear and Daring?
Objection 1: It seems that fort.i.tude is not about fear and daring.
For Gregory says (Moral. vii): ”The fort.i.tude of the just man is to overcome the flesh, to withstand self-indulgence, to quench the l.u.s.ts of the present life.” Therefore fort.i.tude seems to be about pleasures rather than about fear and daring.
Obj. 2: Further, Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii), that it belongs to fort.i.tude to face dangers and to bear toil. But this seemingly has nothing to do with the pa.s.sions of fear and daring, but rather with a man's toilsome deeds and external dangers. Therefore fort.i.tude is not about fear and daring.
Obj. 3: Further, not only daring, but also hope, is opposed to fear, as stated above (I-II, Q. 45, A. 1, ad 2) in the treatise on pa.s.sions. Therefore fort.i.tude should not be about daring any more than about hope.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7; iii, 9) that fort.i.tude is about fear and daring.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), it belongs to the virtue of fort.i.tude to remove any obstacle that withdraws the will from following the reason. Now to be withdrawn from something difficult belongs to the notion of fear, which denotes withdrawal from an evil that entails difficulty, as stated above (I-II, Q. 42, AA. 3, 5) in the treatise on pa.s.sions. Hence fort.i.tude is chiefly about fear of difficult things, which can withdraw the will from following the reason. And it behooves one not only firmly to bear the a.s.sault of these difficulties by restraining fear, but also moderately to withstand them, when, to wit, it is necessary to dispel them altogether in order to free oneself therefrom for the future, which seems to come under the notion of daring. Therefore fort.i.tude is about fear and daring, as curbing fear and moderating daring.
Reply Obj. 1: Gregory is speaking then of the fort.i.tude of the just man, as to its common relation to all virtues. Hence he first of all mentions matters pertaining to temperance, as in the words quoted, and then adds that which pertains properly to fort.i.tude as a special virtue, by saying: ”To love the trials of this life for the sake of an eternal reward.”
Reply Obj. 2: Dangers and toils do not withdraw the will from the course of reason, except in so far as they are an object of fear.
Hence fort.i.tude needs to be immediately about fear and daring, but mediately about dangers and toils, these being the objects of those pa.s.sions.
Reply Obj. 3: Hope is opposed to fear on the part of the object, for hope is of good, fear of evil: whereas daring is about the same object, and is opposed to fear by way of approach and withdrawal, as stated above (I-II, Q. 45, A. 1). And since fort.i.tude properly regards those temporal evils that withdraw one from virtue, as appears from Tully's definition quoted in the Second Objection, it follows that fort.i.tude properly is about fear and daring and not about hope, except in so far as it is connected with daring, as stated above (I-II, Q. 45, A. 2).
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