Part III (Secunda Secundae) Part 185 (1/2)
FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 123, Art. 4]
Whether Fort.i.tude Is Only About Dangers of Death?
Objection 1: It seems that fort.i.tude is not only about dangers of death. For Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xv) that ”fort.i.tude is love bearing all things readily for the sake of the object beloved”: and (Music. vi) he says that fort.i.tude is ”the love which dreads no hards.h.i.+p, not even death.” Therefore fort.i.tude is not only about danger of death, but also about other afflictions.
Obj. 2: Further, all the pa.s.sions of the soul need to be reduced to a mean by some virtue. Now there is no other virtue reducing fears to a mean. Therefore fort.i.tude is not only about fear of death, but also about other fears.
Obj. 3: Further, no virtue is about extremes. But fear of death is about an extreme, since it is the greatest of fears, as stated in _Ethic._ iii. Therefore the virtue of fort.i.tude is not about fear of death.
_On the contrary,_ Andronicus says that ”fort.i.tude is a virtue of the irascible faculty that is not easily deterred by the fear of death.”
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3), it belongs to the virtue of fort.i.tude to guard the will against being withdrawn from the good of reason through fear of bodily evil. Now it behooves one to hold firmly the good of reason against every evil whatsoever, since no bodily good is equivalent to the good of the reason. Hence fort.i.tude of soul must be that which binds the will firmly to the good of reason in face of the greatest evils: because he that stands firm against great things, will in consequence stand firm against less things, but not conversely. Moreover it belongs to the notion of virtue that it should regard something extreme: and the most fearful of all bodily evils is death, since it does away all bodily goods.
Wherefore Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xxii) that ”the soul is shaken by its fellow body, with fear of toil and pain, lest the body be stricken and hara.s.sed with fear of death lest it be done away and destroyed.” Therefore the virtue of fort.i.tude is about the fear of dangers of death.
Reply Obj. 1: Fort.i.tude behaves well in bearing all manner of adversity: yet a man is not reckoned brave simply through bearing any kind of adversity, but only through bearing well even the greatest evils; while through bearing others he is said to be brave in a restricted sense.
Reply Obj. 2: Since fear is born of love, any virtue that moderates the love of certain goods must in consequence moderate the fear of contrary evils: thus liberality, which moderates the love of money, as a consequence, moderates the fear of losing it, and the same is the case with temperance and other virtues. But to love one's own life is natural: and hence the necessity of a special virtue modifying the fear of death.
Reply Obj. 3: In virtues the extreme consists in exceeding right reason: wherefore to undergo the greatest dangers in accordance with reason is not contrary to virtue.
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FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 123, Art. 5]
Whether Fort.i.tude Is Properly About Dangers of Death in Battle?
Objection 1: It seems that fort.i.tude is not properly about dangers of death in battle. For martyrs above all are commended for their fort.i.tude. But martyrs are not commended in connection with battle.
Therefore fort.i.tude is not properly about dangers of death in battle.
Obj. 2: Further, Ambrose says (De Offic. i) that ”fort.i.tude is applicable both to warlike and to civil matters”: and Tully (De Offic. i), under the heading, ”That it pertains to fort.i.tude to excel in battle rather than in civil life,” says: ”Although not a few think that the business of war is of greater importance than the affairs of civil life, this opinion must be qualified: and if we wish to judge the matter truly, there are many things in civil life that are more important and more glorious than those connected with war.” Now greater fort.i.tude is about greater things. Therefore fort.i.tude is not properly concerned with death in battle.
Obj. 3: Further, war is directed to the preservation of a country's temporal peace: for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix) that ”wars are waged in order to insure peace.” Now it does not seem that one ought to expose oneself to the danger of death for the temporal peace of one's country, since this same peace is the occasion of much license in morals. Therefore it seems that the virtue of fort.i.tude is not about the danger of death in battle.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii) that fort.i.tude is chiefly about death in battle.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 4), fort.i.tude strengthens a man's mind against the greatest danger, which is that of death. Now fort.i.tude is a virtue; and it is essential to virtue ever to tend to good; wherefore it is in order to pursue some good that man does not fly from the danger of death. But the dangers of death arising out of sickness, storms at sea, attacks from robbers, and the like, do not seem to come on a man through his pursuing some good. On the other hand, the dangers of death which occur in battle come to man directly on account of some good, because, to wit, he is defending the common good by a just fight. Now a just fight is of two kinds. First, there is the general combat, for instance, of those who fight in battle; secondly, there is the private combat, as when a judge or even private individual does not refrain from giving a just judgment through fear of the impending sword, or any other danger though it threaten death. Hence it belongs to fort.i.tude to strengthen the mind against dangers of death, not only such as arise in a general battle, but also such as occur in singular combat, which may be called by the general name of battle. Accordingly it must be granted that fort.i.tude is properly about dangers of death occurring in battle.
Moreover, a brave man behaves well in face of danger of any other kind of death; especially since man may be in danger of any kind of death on account of virtue: thus may a man not fail to attend on a sick friend through fear of deadly infection, or not refuse to undertake a journey with some G.o.dly object in view through fear of s.h.i.+pwreck or robbers.
Reply Obj. 1: Martyrs face the fight that is waged against their own person, and this for the sake of the sovereign good which is G.o.d; wherefore their fort.i.tude is praised above all. Nor is it outside the genus of fort.i.tude that regards warlike actions, for which reason they are said to have been valiant in battle. [*Office of Martyrs, ex. Heb. xi. 34.]
Reply Obj. 2: Personal and civil business is differentiated from the business of war that regards general wars. However, personal and civil affairs admit of dangers of death arising out of certain conflicts which are private wars, and so with regard to these also there may be fort.i.tude properly so called.
Reply Obj. 3: The peace of the state is good in itself, nor does it become evil because certain persons make evil use of it. For there are many others who make good use of it; and many evils prevented by it, such as murders and sacrileges, are much greater than those which are occasioned by it, and which belong chiefly to the sins of the flesh.
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SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 123, Art. 6]
Whether Endurance Is the Chief Act of Fort.i.tude?
Objection 1: It seems that endurance is not the chief act of fort.i.tude. For virtue ”is about the difficult and the good” (Ethic.