Part III (Secunda Secundae) Part 185 (2/2)
ii, 3). Now it is more difficult to attack than to endure. Therefore endurance is not the chief act of fort.i.tude.
Obj. 2: Further, to be able to act on another seems to argue greater power than not to be changed by another. Now to attack is to act on another, and to endure is to persevere unchangeably. Since then fort.i.tude denotes perfection of power, it seems that it belongs to fort.i.tude to attack rather than to endure.
Obj. 3: Further, one contrary is more distant from the other than its mere negation. Now to endure is merely not to fear, whereas to attack denotes a movement contrary to that of fear, since it implies pursuit. Since then fort.i.tude above all withdraws the mind from fear, it seems that it regards attack rather than endurance.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 9) that ”certain persons are” said to be brave chiefly because they endure affliction.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3), and according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 9), ”fort.i.tude is more concerned to allay fear, than to moderate daring.” For it is more difficult to allay fear than to moderate daring, since the danger which is the object of daring and fear, tends by its very nature to check daring, but to increase fear. Now to attack belongs to fort.i.tude in so far as the latter moderates daring, whereas to endure follows the repression of fear. Therefore the princ.i.p.al act of fort.i.tude is endurance, that is to stand immovable in the midst of dangers rather than to attack them.
Reply Obj. 1: Endurance is more difficult than aggression, for three reasons. First, because endurance seemingly implies that one is being attacked by a stronger person, whereas aggression denotes that one is attacking as though one were the stronger party; and it is more difficult to contend with a stronger than with a weaker. Secondly, because he that endures already feels the presence of danger, whereas the aggressor looks upon danger as something to come; and it is more difficult to be unmoved by the present than by the future. Thirdly, because endurance implies length of time, whereas aggression is consistent with sudden movements; and it is more difficult to remain unmoved for a long time, than to be moved suddenly to something arduous. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that ”some hurry to meet danger, yet fly when the danger is present; this is not the behavior of a brave man.”
Reply Obj. 2: Endurance denotes indeed a pa.s.sion of the body, but an action of the soul cleaving most resolutely (_fortissime_) to good, the result being that it does not yield to the threatening pa.s.sion of the body. Now virtue concerns the soul rather than the body.
Reply Obj. 3: He that endures fears not, though he is confronted with the cause of fear, whereas this cause is not present to the aggressor.
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SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 123, Art. 7]
Whether the Brave Man Acts for the Sake of the Good of His Habit?
Objection 1: It seems that the brave man does not act for the sake of the good of his habit. For in matters of action the end, though first in intention, is last in execution. Now the act of fort.i.tude, in the order of execution, follows the habit of fort.i.tude. Therefore it is impossible for the brave man to act for the sake of the good of his habit.
Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xiii): ”We love virtues for the sake of happiness, and yet some make bold to counsel us to be virtuous,” namely by saying that we should desire virtue for its own sake, ”without loving happiness. If they succeed in their endeavor, we shall surely cease to love virtue itself, since we shall no longer love that for the sake of which alone we love virtue.” But fort.i.tude is a virtue. Therefore the act of fort.i.tude is directed not to fort.i.tude but to happiness.
Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xv) that ”fort.i.tude is love ready to bear all things for G.o.d's sake.” Now G.o.d is not the habit of fort.i.tude, but something better, since the end must needs be better than what is directed to the end. Therefore the brave man does not act for the sake of the good of his habit.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 7) that ”to the brave man fort.i.tude itself is a good”: and such is his end.
_I answer that,_ An end is twofold: proximate and ultimate. Now the proximate end of every agent is to introduce a likeness of that agent's form into something else: thus the end of fire in heating is to introduce the likeness of its heat into some pa.s.sive matter, and the end of the builder is to introduce into matter the likeness of his art. Whatever good ensues from this, if it be intended, may be called the remote end of the agent. Now just as in things made, external matter is fas.h.i.+oned by art, so in things done, human deeds are fas.h.i.+oned by prudence. Accordingly we must conclude that the brave man intends as his proximate end to reproduce in action a likeness of his habit, for he intends to act in accordance with his habit: but his remote end is happiness or G.o.d.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections: for the First Objection proceeds as though the very essence of a habit were its end, instead of the likeness of the habit in act, as stated. The other two objections consider the ultimate end.
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EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 123, Art. 8]
Whether the Brave Man Delights in His Act?
Objection 1: It seems that the brave man delights in his act. For ”delight is the unhindered action of a connatural habit” (Ethic. x, 4, 6, 8). Now the brave deed proceeds from a habit which acts after the manner of nature. Therefore the brave man takes pleasure in his act.
Obj. 2: Further, Ambrose, commenting on Gal. 5:22, ”But the fruit of the Spirit is charity, joy, peace,” says that deeds of virtue are called ”fruits because they refresh man's mind with a holy and pure delight.” Now the brave man performs acts of virtue. Therefore he takes pleasure in his act.
Obj. 3: Further, the weaker is overcome by the stronger. Now the brave man has a stronger love for the good of virtue than for his own body, which he exposes to the danger of death. Therefore the delight in the good of virtue banishes the pain of the body; and consequently the brave man does all things with pleasure.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 9) that ”the brave man seems to have no delight in his act.”
_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 31, AA. 3, 4, 5) where we were treating of the pa.s.sions, pleasure is twofold; one is bodily, resulting from bodily contact, the other is spiritual, resulting from an apprehension of the soul. It is the latter which properly results from deeds of virtue, since in them we consider the good of reason.
Now the princ.i.p.al act of fort.i.tude is to endure, not only certain things that are unpleasant as apprehended by the soul--for instance, the loss of bodily life, which the virtuous man loves not only as a natural good, but also as being necessary for acts of virtue, and things connected with them--but also to endure things unpleasant in respect of bodily contact, such as wounds and blows. Hence the brave man, on one side, has something that affords him delight, namely as regards spiritual pleasure, in the act itself of virtue and the end thereof: while, on the other hand, he has cause for both spiritual sorrow, in the thought of losing his life, and for bodily pain. Hence we read (2 Macc. 6:30) that Eleazar said: ”I suffer grievous pains in body: but in soul am well content to suffer these things because I fear Thee.”
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