Part III (Secunda Secundae) Part 186 (1/2)
Now the sensible pain of the body makes one insensible to the spiritual delight of virtue, without the copious a.s.sistance of G.o.d's grace, which has more strength to raise the soul to the Divine things in which it delights, than bodily pains have to afflict it. Thus the Blessed Tiburtius, while walking barefoot on the burning coal, said that he felt as though he were walking on roses.
Yet the virtue of fort.i.tude prevents the reason from being entirely overcome by bodily pain. And the delight of virtue overcomes spiritual sorrow, inasmuch as a man prefers the good of virtue to the life of the body and to whatever appertains thereto. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3; iii, 9) that ”it is not necessary for a brave man to delight so as to perceive his delight, but it suffices for him not to be sad.”
Reply Obj. 1: The vehemence of the action or pa.s.sion of one power hinders the action of another power: wherefore the pain in his senses hinders the mind of the brave man from feeling delight in its proper operation.
Reply Obj. 2: Deeds of virtue are delightful chiefly on account of their end; yet they can be painful by their nature, and this is princ.i.p.ally the case with fort.i.tude. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 9) that ”to perform deeds with pleasure does not happen in all virtues, except in so far as one attains the end.”
Reply Obj. 3: In the brave man spiritual sorrow is overcome by the delight of virtue. Yet since bodily pain is more sensible, and the sensitive apprehension is more in evidence to man, it follows that spiritual pleasure in the end of virtue fades away, so to speak, in the presence of great bodily pain.
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NINTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 123, Art. 9]
Whether Fort.i.tude Deals Chiefly with Sudden Occurrences?
Objection 1: It seems that fort.i.tude does not deal chiefly with sudden occurrences. For it would seem that things occur suddenly when they are unforeseen. But Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that ”fort.i.tude is the deliberate facing of danger, and bearing of toil.”
Therefore fort.i.tude does not deal chiefly with sudden happenings.
Obj. 2: Further, Ambrose says (De Offic. i): ”The brave man is not unmindful of what may be likely to happen; he takes measures beforehand, and looks out as from the conning-tower of his mind, so as to encounter the future by his forethought, lest he should say afterwards: This befell me because I did not think it could possibly happen.” But it is not possible to be prepared for the future in the case of sudden occurrences. Therefore the operation of fort.i.tude is not concerned with sudden happenings.
Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that the ”brave man is of good hope.” But hope looks forward to the future, which is inconsistent with sudden occurrences. Therefore the operation of fort.i.tude is not concerned with sudden happenings.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that ”fort.i.tude is chiefly about sudden dangers of death.”
_I answer that,_ Two things must be considered in the operation of fort.i.tude. One is in regard to its choice: and thus fort.i.tude is not about sudden occurrences: because the brave man chooses to think beforehand of the dangers that may arise, in order to be able to withstand them, or to bear them more easily: since according to Gregory (Hom. xxv in Evang.), ”the blow that is foreseen strikes with less force, and we are able more easily to bear earthly wrongs, if we are forearmed with the s.h.i.+eld of foreknowledge.” The other thing to be considered in the operation of fort.i.tude regards the display of the virtuous habit: and in this way fort.i.tude is chiefly about sudden occurrences, because according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 8) the habit of fort.i.tude is displayed chiefly in sudden dangers: since a habit works by way of nature. Wherefore if a person without forethought does that which pertains to virtue, when necessity urges on account of some sudden danger, this is a very strong proof that habitual fort.i.tude is firmly seated in his mind.
Yet is it possible for a person even without the habit of fort.i.tude, to prepare his mind against danger by long forethought: in the same way as a brave man prepares himself when necessary. This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
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TENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 123, Art. 10]
Whether the Brave Man Makes Use of Anger in His Action?
Objection 1: It seems that the brave man does not use anger in his action. For no one should employ as an instrument of his action that which he cannot use at will. Now man cannot use anger at will, so as to take it up and lay it aside when he will. For, as the Philosopher says (De Memoria ii), when a bodily pa.s.sion is in movement, it does not rest at once just as one wishes. Therefore a brave man should not employ anger for his action.
Obj. 2: Further, if a man is competent to do a thing by himself, he should not seek the a.s.sistance of something weaker and more imperfect. Now the reason is competent to achieve by itself deeds of fort.i.tude, wherein anger is impotent: wherefore Seneca says (De Ira i): ”Reason by itself suffices not only to make us prepared for action but also to accomplish it. In fact is there greater folly than for reason to seek help from anger? the steadfast from the unstaid, the trusty from the untrustworthy, the healthy from the sick?”
Therefore a brave man should not make use of anger.
Obj. 3: Further, just as people are more earnest in doing deeds of fort.i.tude on account of anger, so are they on account of sorrow or desire; wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that wild beasts are incited to face danger through sorrow or pain, and adulterous persons dare many things for the sake of desire. Now fort.i.tude employs neither sorrow nor desire for its action. Therefore in like manner it should not employ anger.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that ”anger helps the brave.”
_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 24, A. 2), concerning anger and the other pa.s.sions there was a difference of opinion between the Peripatetics and the Stoics. For the Stoics excluded anger and all other pa.s.sions of the soul from the mind of a wise or good man: whereas the Peripatetics, of whom Aristotle was the chief, ascribed to virtuous men both anger and the other pa.s.sions of the soul albeit modified by reason. And possibly they differed not in reality but in their way of speaking. For the Peripatetics, as stated above (I-II, Q. 24, A. 2), gave the name of pa.s.sions to all the movements of the sensitive appet.i.te, however they may comport themselves. And since the sensitive appet.i.te is moved by the command of reason, so that it may cooperate by rendering action more prompt, they held that virtuous persons should employ both anger and the other pa.s.sions of the soul, modified according to the dictate of reason. On the other hand, the Stoics gave the name of pa.s.sions to certain immoderate emotions of the sensitive appet.i.te, wherefore they called them sicknesses or diseases, and for this reason severed them altogether from virtue.
Accordingly the brave man employs moderate anger for his action, but not immoderate anger.
Reply Obj. 1: Anger that is moderated in accordance with reason is subject to the command of reason: so that man uses it at his will, which would not be the case were it immoderate.
Reply Obj. 2: Reason employs anger for its action, not as seeking its a.s.sistance, but because it uses the sensitive appet.i.te as an instrument, just as it uses the members of the body. Nor is it unbecoming for the instrument to be more imperfect than the princ.i.p.al agent, even as the hammer is more imperfect than the smith. Moreover, Seneca was a follower of the Stoics, and the above words were aimed by him directly at Aristotle.
Reply Obj. 3: Whereas fort.i.tude, as stated above (A. 6), has two acts, namely endurance and aggression, it employs anger, not for the act of endurance, because the reason by itself performs this act, but for the act of aggression, for which it employs anger rather than the other pa.s.sions, since it belongs to anger to strike at the cause of sorrow, so that it directly cooperates with fort.i.tude in attacking.
On the other hand, sorrow by its very nature gives way to the thing that hurts; though accidentally it helps in aggression, either as being the cause of anger, as stated above (I-II, Q. 47, A. 3), or as making a person expose himself to danger in order to escape from sorrow. In like manner desire, by its very nature, tends to a pleasurable good, to which it is directly contrary to withstand danger: yet accidentally sometimes it helps one to attack, in so far as one prefers to risk dangers rather than lack pleasure. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5): ”Of all the cases in which fort.i.tude arises from a pa.s.sion, the most natural is when a man is brave through anger, making his choice and acting for a purpose,”