Part III (Secunda Secundae) Part 186 (2/2)
i.e. for a due end; ”this is true fort.i.tude.”
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ELEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 123, Art. 11]
Whether Fort.i.tude Is a Cardinal Virtue?
Objection 1: It seems that fort.i.tude is not a cardinal virtue. For, as stated above (A. 10), anger is closely allied with fort.i.tude. Now anger is not accounted a princ.i.p.al pa.s.sion; nor is daring which belongs to fort.i.tude. Therefore neither should fort.i.tude be reckoned a cardinal virtue.
Obj. 2: Further, the object of virtue is good. But the direct object of fort.i.tude is not good, but evil, for it is endurance of evil and toil, as Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii). Therefore fort.i.tude is not a cardinal virtue.
Obj. 3: Further, the cardinal virtues are about those things upon which human life is chiefly occupied, just as a door turns upon a hinge (_cardine_). But fort.i.tude is about dangers of death which are of rare occurrence in human life. Therefore fort.i.tude should not be reckoned a cardinal or princ.i.p.al virtue.
_On the contrary,_ Gregory (Moral. xxii), Ambrose in his commentary on Luke 6:20, and Augustine (De Moribus Eccl. xv), number fort.i.tude among the four cardinal or princ.i.p.al virtues.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 61, AA. 3, 4), those virtues are said to be cardinal or princ.i.p.al which have a foremost claim to that which belongs to the virtues in common. And among other conditions of virtue in general one is that it is stated to ”act steadfastly,” according to _Ethic._ ii, 4. Now fort.i.tude above all lays claim to praise for steadfastness. Because he that stands firm is so much the more praised, as he is more strongly impelled to fall or recede. Now man is impelled to recede from that which is in accordance with reason, both by the pleasing good and the displeasing evil. But bodily pain impels him more strongly than pleasure. For Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 36): ”There is none that does not shun pain more than he desires pleasure. For we perceive that even the most untamed beasts are deterred from the greatest pleasures by the fear of pain.” And among the pains of the mind and dangers those are mostly feared which lead to death, and it is against them that the brave man stands firm. Therefore fort.i.tude is a cardinal virtue.
Reply Obj. 1: Daring and anger do not cooperate with fort.i.tude in its act of endurance, wherein its steadfastness is chiefly commended: for it is by that act that the brave man curbs fear, which is a princ.i.p.al pa.s.sion, as stated above (I-II, Q. 25, A. 4).
Reply Obj. 2: Virtue is directed to the good of reason which it behooves to safeguard against the onslaught of evils. And fort.i.tude is directed to evils of the body, as contraries which it withstands, and to the good of reason, as the end, which it intends to safeguard.
Reply Obj. 3: Though dangers of death are of rare occurrence, yet the occasions of those dangers occur frequently, since on account of justice which he pursues, and also on account of other good deeds, man encounters mortal adversaries.
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TWELFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 123, Art. 12]
Whether Fort.i.tude Excels Among All Other Virtues?
Objection 1: It seems that fort.i.tude excels among all other virtues.
For Ambrose says (De Offic. i): ”Fort.i.tude is higher, so to speak, than the rest.”
Obj. 2: Further, virtue is about that which is difficult and good.
But fort.i.tude is about most difficult things. Therefore it is the greatest of the virtues.
Obj. 3: Further, the person of a man is more excellent than his possessions. But fort.i.tude is about a man's person, for it is this that a man exposes to the danger of death for the good of virtue: whereas justice and the other moral virtues are about other and external things. Therefore fort.i.tude is the chief of the moral virtues.
Obj. 4: _On the contrary,_ Tully says (De Offic. i): ”Justice is the most resplendent of the virtues and gives its name to a good man.”
Obj. 5: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 19): ”Those virtues must needs be greatest which are most profitable to others.” Now liberality seems to be more useful than fort.i.tude. Therefore it is a greater virtue.
_I answer that,_ As Augustine says (De Trin. vi), ”In things that are great, but not in bulk, to be great is to be good”: wherefore the better a virtue the greater it is. Now reason's good is man's good, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) prudence, since it is a perfection of reason, has the good essentially: while justice effects this good, since it belongs to justice to establish the order of reason in all human affairs: whereas the other virtues safeguard this good, inasmuch as they moderate the pa.s.sions, lest they lead man away from reason's good. As to the order of the latter, fort.i.tude holds the first place, because fear of dangers of death has the greatest power to make man recede from the good of reason: and after fort.i.tude comes temperance, since also pleasures of touch excel all others in hindering the good of reason. Now to be a thing essentially ranks before effecting it, and the latter ranks before safeguarding it by removing obstacles thereto. Wherefore among the cardinal virtues, prudence ranks first, justice second, fort.i.tude third, temperance fourth, and after these the other virtues.
Reply Obj. 1: Ambrose places fort.i.tude before the other virtues, in respect of a certain general utility, inasmuch as it is useful both in warfare, and in matters relating to civil or home life. Hence he begins by saying (De Offic. i): ”Now we come to treat of fort.i.tude, which being higher so to speak than the others, is applicable both to warlike and to civil matters.”
Reply Obj. 2: Virtue essentially regards the good rather than the difficult. Hence the greatness of a virtue is measured according to its goodness rather than its difficulty.
Reply Obj. 3: A man does not expose his person to dangers of death except in order to safeguard justice: wherefore the praise awarded to fort.i.tude depends somewhat on justice. Hence Ambrose says (De Offic.
i) that ”fort.i.tude without justice is an occasion of injustice; since the stronger a man is the more ready is he to oppress the weaker.”
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