Part III (Secunda Secundae) Part 201 (1/2)

Obj. 2: Further, every part of a moral virtue is about certain pa.s.sions which that virtue moderates. Now perseverance does not imply moderation of the pa.s.sions: since the more violent the pa.s.sions, the more praiseworthy is it to persevere in accordance with reason.

Therefore it seems that perseverance is a part not of a moral virtue, but rather of prudence which perfects the reason.

Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Persev. i) that no one can lose perseverance; whereas one can lose the other virtues. Therefore perseverance is greater than all the other virtues. Now a princ.i.p.al virtue is greater than its part. Therefore perseverance is not a part of a virtue, but is itself a princ.i.p.al virtue.

_On the contrary,_ Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) reckons perseverance as a part of fort.i.tude.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 123, A. 2; I-II, Q. 61, AA. 3, 4), a princ.i.p.al virtue is one to which is princ.i.p.ally ascribed something that lays claim to the praise of virtue, inasmuch as it practices it in connection with its own matter, wherein it is most difficult of accomplishment. In accordance with this it has been stated (Q. 123, A. 2) that fort.i.tude is a princ.i.p.al virtue, because it observes firmness in matters wherein it is most difficult to stand firm, namely in dangers of death. Wherefore it follows of necessity that every virtue which has a t.i.tle to praise for the firm endurance of something difficult must be annexed to fort.i.tude as secondary to princ.i.p.al virtue. Now the endurance of difficulty arising from delay in accomplis.h.i.+ng a good work gives perseverance its claim to praise: nor is this so difficult as to endure dangers of death. Therefore perseverance is annexed to fort.i.tude, as secondary to princ.i.p.al virtue.

Reply Obj. 1: The annexing of secondary to princ.i.p.al virtues depends not only on the matter [*Cf. Q. 136, A. 4, ad 2], but also on the mode, because in everything form is of more account than matter.

Wherefore although, as to matter, perseverance seems to have more in common with temperance than with fort.i.tude, yet, in mode, it has more in common with fort.i.tude, in the point of standing firm against the difficulty arising from length of time.

Reply Obj. 2: The perseverance of which the Philosopher speaks (Ethic. vii, 4, 7) does not moderate any pa.s.sions, but consists merely in a certain firmness of reason and will. But perseverance, considered as a virtue, moderates certain pa.s.sions, namely fear of weariness or failure on account of the delay. Hence this virtue, like fort.i.tude, is in the irascible.

Reply Obj. 3: Augustine speaks there of perseverance, as denoting, not a virtuous habit, but a virtuous act sustained to the end, according to Matt. 24:13, ”He that shall persevere to the end, he shall be saved.” Hence it is incompatible with such like perseverance for it to be lost, since it would no longer endure to the end.

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THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 137. Art. 3]

Whether Constancy Pertains to Perseverance?

Objection 1: It seems that constancy does not pertain to perseverance. For constancy pertains to patience, as stated above (Q.

137, A. 5): and patience differs from perseverance. Therefore constancy does not pertain to perseverance.

Obj. 2: Further, ”virtue is about the difficult and the good.” Now it does not seem difficult to be constant in little works, but only in great deeds, which pertain to magnificence. Therefore constancy pertains to magnificence rather than to perseverance.

Obj. 3: Further, if constancy pertained to perseverance, it would seem nowise to differ from it, since both denote a kind of unchangeableness. Yet they differ: for Macrobius (In Somn. Scip. i) condivides constancy with firmness by which he indicates perseverance, as stated above (Q. 128, A. 6). Therefore constancy does not pertain to perseverance.

_On the contrary,_ One is said to be constant because one stands to a thing. Now it belongs to perseverance to stand to certain things, as appears from the definition given by Andronicus. Therefore constancy belongs to perseverance.

_I answer that,_ Perseverance and constancy agree as to end, since it belongs to both to persist firmly in some good: but they differ as to those things which make it difficult to persist in good. Because the virtue of perseverance properly makes man persist firmly in good, against the difficulty that arises from the very continuance of the act: whereas constancy makes him persist firmly in good against difficulties arising from any other external hindrances. Hence perseverance takes precedence of constancy as a part of fort.i.tude, because the difficulty arising from continuance of action is more intrinsic to the act of virtue than that which arises from external obstacles.

Reply Obj. 1: External obstacles to persistence in good are especially those which cause sorrow. Now patience is about sorrow, as stated above (Q. 136, A. 1). Hence constancy agrees with perseverance as to end: while it agrees with patience as to those things which occasion difficulty. Now the end is of most account: wherefore constancy pertains to perseverance rather than to patience.

Reply Obj. 2: It is more difficult to persist in great deeds: yet in little or ordinary deeds, it is difficult to persist for any length of time, if not on account of the greatness of the deed which magnificence considers, yet from its very continuance which perseverance regards. Hence constancy may pertain to both.

Reply Obj. 3: Constancy pertains to perseverance in so far as it has something in common with it: but it is not the same thing in the point of their difference, as stated in the Article.

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FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 137, Art. 4]

Whether Perseverance Needs the Help of Grace?

[*Cf. I-II, Q. 109, A. 10]

Objection 1: It seems that perseverance does not need the help of grace. For perseverance is a virtue, as stated above (A. 1). Now according to Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) virtue acts after the manner of nature. Therefore the sole inclination of virtue suffices for perseverance. Therefore this does not need the help of grace.

Obj. 2: Further, the gift of Christ's grace is greater than the harm brought upon us by Adam, as appears from Rom. 5:15, seqq. Now ”before sin man was so framed that he could persevere by means of what he had received,” as Augustine says (De Correp. et Grat. xi). Much more therefore can man, after being repaired by the grace of Christ, persevere without the help of a further grace.

Obj. 3: Further, sinful deeds are sometimes more difficult than deeds of virtue: hence it is said in the person of the wicked (Wis. 5:7): ”We ... have walked through hard ways.” Now some persevere in sinful deeds without the help of another. Therefore man can also persevere in deeds of virtue without the help of grace.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Persev. i): ”We hold that perseverance is a gift of G.o.d, whereby we persevere unto the end, in Christ.”