Part III (Secunda Secundae) Part 201 (2/2)

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1, ad 2; A. 2, ad 3), perseverance has a twofold signification. First, it denotes the habit of perseverance, considered as a virtue. In this way it needs the gift of habitual grace, even as the other infused virtues. Secondly, it may be taken to denote the act of perseverance enduring until death: and in this sense it needs not only habitual grace, but also the gratuitous help of G.o.d sustaining man in good until the end of life, as stated above (I-II, Q. 109, A. 10), when we were treating of grace. Because, since the free-will is changeable by its very nature, which changeableness is not taken away from it by the habitual grace bestowed in the present life, it is not in the power of the free-will, albeit repaired by grace, to abide unchangeably in good, though it is in its power to choose this: for it is often in our power to choose yet not to accomplish.

Reply Obj. 1: The virtue of perseverance, so far as it is concerned, inclines one to persevere: yet since it is a habit, and a habit is a thing one uses at will, it does not follow that a person who has the habit of virtue uses it unchangeably until death.

Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says (De Correp. et Grat. xi), ”it was given to the first man, not to persevere, but to be able to persevere of his free-will: because then no corruption was in human nature to make perseverance difficult. Now, however, by the grace of Christ, the predestined receive not only the possibility of persevering, but perseverance itself. Wherefore the first man whom no man threatened, of his own free-will rebelling against a threatening G.o.d, forfeited so great a happiness and so great a facility of avoiding sin: whereas these, although the world rage against their constancy, have persevered in faith.”

Reply Obj. 3: Man is able by himself to fall into sin, but he cannot by himself arise from sin without the help of grace. Hence by falling into sin, so far as he is concerned man makes himself to be persevering in sin, unless he be delivered by G.o.d's grace. On the other hand, by doing good he does not make himself to be persevering in good, because he is able, by himself, to sin: wherefore he needs the help of grace for that end.

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QUESTION 138

OF THE VICES OPPOSED TO PERSEVERANCE (In Two Articles)

We must now consider the vices opposed to perseverance; under which head there are two points of inquiry:

(1) Of effeminacy;

(2) Of pertinacity.

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FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 138, Art. 1]

Whether Effeminacy* Is Opposed to Perseverance?

[* _Mollities,_ literally ”softness”]

Objection 1: It seems that effeminacy is not opposed to perseverance.

For a gloss on 1 Cor. 6:9, 10, ”Nor adulterers, nor the effeminate, nor liers with mankind,” expounds the text thus: ”Effeminate--i.e.

obscene, given to unnatural vice.” But this is opposed to chast.i.ty.

Therefore effeminacy is not a vice opposed to perseverance.

Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that ”delicacy is a kind of effeminacy.” But to be delicate seems akin to intemperance. Therefore effeminacy is not opposed to perseverance but to temperance.

Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that ”the man who is fond of amus.e.m.e.nt is effeminate.” Now immoderate fondness of amus.e.m.e.nt is opposed to _eutrapelia_, which is the virtue about pleasures of play, as stated in _Ethic._ iv, 8. Therefore effeminacy is not opposed to perseverance.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that ”the persevering man is opposed to the effeminate.”

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 137, AA. 1, 2), perseverance is deserving of praise because thereby a man does not forsake a good on account of long endurance of difficulties and toils: and it is directly opposed to this, seemingly, for a man to be ready to forsake a good on account of difficulties which he cannot endure. This is what we understand by effeminacy, because a thing is said to be ”soft” if it readily yields to the touch. Now a thing is not declared to be soft through yielding to a heavy blow, for walls yield to the battering-ram. Wherefore a man is not said to be effeminate if he yields to heavy blows. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that ”it is no wonder, if a person is overcome by strong and overwhelming pleasures or sorrows; but he is to be pardoned if he struggles against them.” Now it is evident that fear of danger is more impelling than the desire of pleasure: wherefore Tully says (De Offic. i) under the heading ”True magnanimity consists of two things”: ”It is inconsistent for one who is not cast down by fear, to be defeated by l.u.s.t, or who has proved himself unbeaten by toil, to yield to pleasure.” Moreover, pleasure itself is a stronger motive of attraction than sorrow, for the lack of pleasure is a motive of withdrawal, since lack of pleasure is a pure privation. Wherefore, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 7), properly speaking an effeminate man is one who withdraws from good on account of sorrow caused by lack of pleasure, yielding as it were to a weak motion.

Reply Obj. 1: This effeminacy is caused in two ways. In one way, by custom: for where a man is accustomed to enjoy pleasures, it is more difficult for him to endure the lack of them. In another way, by natural disposition, because, to wit, his mind is less persevering through the frailty of his temperament. This is how women are compared to men, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7): wherefore those who are pa.s.sively sodomitical are said to be effeminate, being womanish themselves, as it were.

Reply Obj. 2: Toil is opposed to bodily pleasure: wherefore it is only toilsome things that are a hindrance to pleasures. Now the delicate are those who cannot endure toils, nor anything that diminishes pleasure. Hence it is written (Deut. 28:56): ”The tender and delicate woman, that could not go upon the ground, nor set down her foot for ... softness [Douay: 'niceness'].” Thus delicacy is a kind of effeminacy. But properly speaking effeminacy regards lack of pleasures, while delicacy regards the cause that hinders pleasure, for instance toil or the like.

Reply Obj. 3: In play two things may be considered. In the first place there is the pleasure, and thus inordinate fondness of play is opposed to _eutrapelia_. Secondly, we may consider the relaxation or rest which is opposed to toil. Accordingly just as it belongs to effeminacy to be unable to endure toilsome things, so too it belongs thereto to desire play or any other relaxation inordinately.

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SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 138, Art. 2]

Whether Pertinacity Is Opposed to Perseverance?

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