Part III (Secunda Secundae) Part 204 (1/2)
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7; iii, 10) reckons it a special virtue.
_I answer that,_ It is customary in human speech to employ a common term in a restricted sense in order to designate the princ.i.p.al things to which that common term is applicable: thus the word ”city” is used antonomastically* to designate Rome. [*Antonomasia is the figure of speech whereby we subst.i.tute the general for the individual term; e.g. The Philosopher for Aristotle]. Accordingly the word ”temperance” has a twofold acceptation. First, in accordance with its common signification: and thus temperance is not a special but a general virtue, because the word ”temperance” signifies a certain temperateness or moderation, which reason appoints to human operations and pa.s.sions: and this is common to every moral virtue.
Yet there is a logical difference between temperance and fort.i.tude, even if we take them both as general virtues: since temperance withdraws man from things which seduce the appet.i.te from obeying reason, while fort.i.tude incites him to endure or withstand those things on account of which he forsakes the good of reason.
On the other hand, if we take temperance antonomastically, as withholding the appet.i.te from those things which are most seductive to man, it is a special virtue, for thus it has, like fort.i.tude, a special matter.
Reply Obj. 1: Man's appet.i.te is corrupted chiefly by those things which seduce him into forsaking the rule of reason and Divine law.
Wherefore integrity, which Augustine ascribes to temperance, can, like the latter, be taken in two ways: first, in a general sense, and secondly in a sense of excellence.
Reply Obj. 2: The things about which temperance is concerned have a most disturbing effect on the soul, for the reason that they are natural to man, as we shall state further on (AA. 4, 5). Hence tranquillity of soul is ascribed to temperance by way of excellence, although it is a common property of all the virtues.
Reply Obj. 3: Although beauty is becoming to every virtue, it is ascribed to temperance, by way of excellence, for two reasons. First, in respect of the generic notion of temperance, which consists in a certain moderate and fitting proportion, and this is what we understand by beauty, as attested by Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv).
Secondly, because the things from which temperance withholds us, hold the lowest place in man, and are becoming to him by reason of his animal nature, as we shall state further on (AA. 4, 5; Q. 142, A. 4), wherefore it is natural that such things should defile him. In consequence beauty is a foremost attribute of temperance which above all hinders man from being defiled. In like manner honesty [*Honesty must be taken here in its broad sense as synonymous with moral goodness, from the point of view of decorum] is a special attribute of temperance: for Isidore says (Etym. x): ”An honest man is one who has no defilement, for honesty means an honorable state.” This is most applicable to temperance, which withstands the vices that bring most dishonor on man, as we shall state further on (Q. 142, A. 4).
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THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 141, Art. 3]
Whether Temperance Is Only About Desires and Pleasures?
Objection 1: It would seem that temperance is not only about desires and pleasures. For Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54) that ”temperance is reason's firm and moderate mastery of l.u.s.t and other wanton emotions of the mind.” Now all the pa.s.sions of the soul are called emotions of the mind. Therefore it seems that temperance is not only about desires and pleasures.
Obj. 2: Further, ”Virtue is about the difficult and the good”
[*Ethic. ii, 3]. Now it seems more difficult to temper fear, especially with regard to dangers of death, than to moderate desires and pleasures, which are despised on account of deadly pains and dangers, according to Augustine (QQ. 83, qu. 36). Therefore it seems that the virtue of temperance is not chiefly about desires and pleasures.
Obj. 3: Further, according to Ambrose (De Offic. i, 43) ”the grace of moderation belongs to temperance”: and Tully says (De Offic. ii, 27) that ”it is the concern of temperance to calm all disturbances of the mind and to enforce moderation.” Now moderation is needed, not only in desires and pleasures, but also in external acts and whatever pertains to the exterior. Therefore temperance is not only about desires and pleasures.
_On the contrary,_ Isidore says (Etym.) [*The words quoted do not occur in the work referred to; Cf. his De Summo Bono x.x.xvii, xlii, and De Different. ii, 39]: that ”it is temperance whereby l.u.s.t and desire are kept under control.”
_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 123, A. 12; Q. 136, A. 1), it belongs to moral virtue to safeguard the good of reason against the pa.s.sions that rebel against reason. Now the movement of the soul's pa.s.sions is twofold, as stated above (I-II, Q. 23, A. 2), when we were treating of the pa.s.sions: the one, whereby the sensitive appet.i.te pursues sensible and bodily goods, the other whereby it flies from sensible and bodily evils.
The first of these movements of the sensitive appet.i.te rebels against reason chiefly by lack of moderation. Because sensible and bodily goods, considered in their species, are not in opposition to reason, but are subject to it as instruments which reason employs in order to attain its proper end: and that they are opposed to reason is owing to the fact that the sensitive appet.i.te fails to tend towards them in accord with the mode of reason. Hence it belongs properly to moral virtue to moderate those pa.s.sions which denote a pursuit of the good.
On the other hand, the movement of the sensitive appet.i.te in flying from sensible evil is mostly in opposition to reason, not through being immoderate, but chiefly in respect of its flight: because, when a man flies from sensible and bodily evils, which sometimes accompany the good of reason, the result is that he flies from the good of reason. Hence it belongs to moral virtue to make man while flying from evil to remain firm in the good of reason.
Accordingly, just as the virtue of fort.i.tude, which by its very nature bestows firmness, is chiefly concerned with the pa.s.sion, viz.
fear, which regards flight from bodily evils, and consequently with daring, which attacks the objects of fear in the hope of attaining some good, so, too, temperance, which denotes a kind of moderation, is chiefly concerned with those pa.s.sions that tend towards sensible goods, viz. desire and pleasure, and consequently with the sorrows that arise from the absence of those pleasures. For just as daring presupposes objects of fear, so too such like sorrow arises from the absence of the aforesaid pleasures.
Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (I-II, Q. 23, AA. 1, 2; I-II, Q. 25, A.
1), when we were treating of the pa.s.sions, those pa.s.sions which pertain to avoidance of evil, presuppose the pa.s.sions pertaining to the pursuit of good; and the pa.s.sions of the irascible presuppose the pa.s.sions of the concupiscible. Hence, while temperance directly moderates the pa.s.sions of the concupiscible which tend towards good, as a consequence, it moderates all the other pa.s.sions, inasmuch as moderation of the pa.s.sions that precede results in moderation of the pa.s.sions that follow: since he that is not immoderate in desire is moderate in hope, and grieves moderately for the absence of the things he desires.
Reply Obj. 2: Desire denotes an impulse of the appet.i.te towards the object of pleasure and this impulse needs control, which belongs to temperance. On the other hand fear denotes a withdrawal of the mind from certain evils, against which man needs firmness of mind, which fort.i.tude bestows. Hence temperance is properly about desires, and fort.i.tude about fears.
Reply Obj. 3: External acts proceed from the internal pa.s.sions of the soul: wherefore their moderation depends on the moderation of the internal pa.s.sions.
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FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 141, Art. 4]
Whether Temperance Is Only About Desires and Pleasures of Touch?