Part III (Secunda Secundae) Part 204 (2/2)
Objection 1: It would seem that temperance is not only about desires and pleasures of touch. For Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xix) that ”the function of temperance is to control and quell the desires which draw us to the things which withdraw us from the laws of G.o.d and from the fruit of His goodness”; and a little further on he adds that ”it is the duty of temperance to spurn all bodily allurements and popular praise.” Now we are withdrawn from G.o.d's laws not only by the desire for pleasures of touch, but also by the desire for pleasures of the other senses, for these, too, belong to the bodily allurements, and again by the desire for riches or for worldly glory: wherefore it is written (1 Tim. 6:10). ”Desire [*_Cupiditas,_ which the Douay version following the Greek _philargyria_ renders 'desire of money'] is the root of all evils.” Therefore temperance is not only about desires of pleasures of touch.
Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that ”one who is worthy of small things and deems himself worthy of them is temperate, but he is not magnificent.” Now honors, whether small or great, of which he is speaking there, are an object of pleasure, not of touch, but in the soul's apprehension. Therefore temperance is not only about desires for pleasures of touch.
Obj. 3: Further, things that are of the same genus would seem to pertain to the matter of a particular virtue under one same aspect.
Now all pleasures of sense are apparently of the same genus.
Therefore they all equally belong to the matter of temperance.
Obj. 4: Further, spiritual pleasures are greater than the pleasures of the body, as stated above (I-II, Q. 31, A. 5) in the treatise on the pa.s.sions. Now sometimes men forsake G.o.d's laws and the state of virtue through desire for spiritual pleasures, for instance, through curiosity in matters of knowledge: wherefore the devil promised man knowledge, saying (Gen. 3:5): ”Ye shall be as G.o.ds, knowing good and evil.” Therefore temperance is not only about pleasures of touch.
Obj. 5: Further, if pleasures of touch were the proper matter of temperance, it would follow that temperance is about all pleasures of touch. But it is not about all, for instance, about those which occur in games. Therefore pleasures of touch are not the proper matter of temperance.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10) that ”temperance is properly about desires of pleasures of touch.”
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3), temperance is about desires and pleasures in the same way as fort.i.tude is about fear and daring.
Now fort.i.tude is about fear and daring with respect to the greatest evils whereby nature itself is dissolved; and such are dangers of death. Wherefore in like manner temperance must needs be about desires for the greatest pleasures. And since pleasure results from a natural operation, it is so much the greater according as it results from a more natural operation. Now to animals the most natural operations are those which preserve the nature of the individual by means of meat and drink, and the nature of the species by the union of the s.e.xes. Hence temperance is properly about pleasures of meat and drink and s.e.xual pleasures. Now these pleasures result from the sense of touch. Wherefore it follows that temperance is about pleasures of touch.
Reply Obj. 1: In the pa.s.sage quoted Augustine apparently takes temperance, not as a special virtue having a determinate matter, but as concerned with the moderation of reason, in any matter whatever: and this is a general condition of every virtue. However, we may also reply that if a man can control the greatest pleasures, much more can he control lesser ones. Wherefore it belongs chiefly and properly to temperance to moderate desires and pleasures of touch, and secondarily other pleasures.
Reply Obj. 2: The Philosopher takes temperance as denoting moderation in external things, when, to wit, a man tends to that which is proportionate to him, but not as denoting moderation in the soul's emotions, which pertains to the virtue of temperance.
Reply Obj. 3: The pleasures of the other senses play a different part in man and in other animals. For in other animals pleasures do not result from the other senses save in relation to sensibles of touch: thus the lion is pleased to see the stag, or to hear its voice, in relation to his food. On the other hand man derives pleasure from the other senses, not only for this reason, but also on account of the becomingness of the sensible object. Wherefore temperance is about the pleasures of the other senses, in relation to pleasures of touch, not princ.i.p.ally but consequently: while in so far as the sensible objects of the other senses are pleasant on account of their becomingness, as when a man is pleased at a well-harmonized sound, this pleasure has nothing to do with the preservation of nature.
Hence these pa.s.sions are not of such importance that temperance can be referred to them antonomastically.
Reply Obj. 4: Although spiritual pleasures are by their nature greater than bodily pleasures, they are not so perceptible to the senses, and consequently they do not so strongly affect the sensitive appet.i.te, against whose impulse the good of reason is safeguarded by moral virtue. We may also reply that spiritual pleasures, strictly speaking, are in accordance with reason, wherefore they need no control, save accidentally, in so far as one spiritual pleasure is a hindrance to another greater and more binding.
Reply Obj. 5: Not all pleasures of touch regard the preservation of nature, and consequently it does not follow that temperance is about all pleasures of touch.
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FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 141, Art. 5]
Whether Temperance Is About the Pleasures Proper to the Taste?
Objection 1: It would seem that temperance is about pleasures proper to the taste. For pleasures of the taste result from food and drink, which are more necessary to man's life than s.e.xual pleasures, which regard the touch. But according to what has been said (A. 4), temperance is about pleasures in things that are necessary to human life. Therefore temperance is about pleasures proper to the taste rather than about those proper to the touch.
Obj. 2: Further, temperance is about the pa.s.sions rather than about things themselves. Now, according to _De Anima_ ii, 3, ”the touch is the sense of food,” as regards the very substance of the food, whereas ”savor” which is the proper object of the taste, is ”the pleasing quality of the food.” Therefore temperance is about the taste rather than about the touch.
Obj. 3: Further, according to _Ethic._ vii, 4, 7: ”temperance and intemperance are about the same things, and so are continence and incontinence, perseverance, and effeminacy,” to which delicacy pertains. Now delicacy seems to regard the delight taken in savors which are the object of the taste. Therefore temperance is about pleasures proper to the taste.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10) that ”seemingly temperance and intemperance have little if anything to do with the taste.”
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 4), temperance is about the greatest pleasures, which chiefly regard the preservation of human life either in the species or in the individual. In these matters certain things are to be considered as princ.i.p.al and others as secondary. The princ.i.p.al thing is the use itself of the necessary means, of the woman who is necessary for the preservation of the species, or of food and drink which are necessary for the preservation of the individual: while the very use of these necessary things has a certain essential pleasure annexed thereto.
In regard to either use we consider as secondary whatever makes the use more pleasurable, such as beauty and adornment in woman, and a pleasing savor and likewise odor in food. Hence temperance is chiefly about the pleasure of touch, that results essentially from the use of these necessary things, which use is in all cases attained by the touch. Secondarily, however, temperance and intemperance are about pleasures of the taste, smell, or sight, inasmuch as the sensible objects of these senses conduce to the pleasurable use of the necessary things that have relation to the touch. But since the taste is more akin to the touch than the other senses are, it follows that temperance is more about the taste than about the other senses.
Reply Obj. 1: The use of food and the pleasure that essentially results therefrom pertain to the touch. Hence the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 3) that ”touch is the sense of food, for food is hot or cold, wet or dry.” To the taste belongs the discernment of savors, which make the food pleasant to eat, in so far as they are signs of its being suitable for nourishment.
Reply Obj. 2: The pleasure resulting from savor is additional, so to speak, whereas the pleasure of touch results essentially from the use of food and drink.
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