Part III (Secunda Secundae) Part 229 (1/2)
Obj. 4: Further, all that makes us depart from likeness to G.o.d is evil. Now anger always makes us depart from likeness to G.o.d, since G.o.d judges with tranquillity according to Wis. 12:18. Therefore to be angry is always an evil.
_On the contrary,_ Chrysostom [*Hom. xi in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says: ”He that is angry without cause, shall be in danger; but he that is angry with cause, shall not be in danger: for without anger, teaching will be useless, judgments unstable, crimes unchecked.” Therefore to be angry is not always an evil.
_I answer that,_ Properly speaking anger is a pa.s.sion of the sensitive appet.i.te, and gives its name to the irascible power, as stated above (I-II, Q. 46, A. 1) when we were treating of the pa.s.sions. Now with regard to the pa.s.sions of the soul, it is to be observed that evil may be found in them in two ways. First by reason of the pa.s.sion's very species, which is derived from the pa.s.sion's object. Thus envy, in respect of its species, denotes an evil, since it is displeasure at another's good, and such displeasure is in itself contrary to reason: wherefore, as the Philosopher remarks (Ethic. ii, 6), ”the very mention of envy denotes something evil.”
Now this does not apply to anger, which is the desire for revenge, since revenge may be desired both well and ill. Secondly, evil is found in a pa.s.sion in respect of the pa.s.sion's quant.i.ty, that is in respect of its excess or deficiency; and thus evil may be found in anger, when, to wit, one is angry, more or less than right reason demands. But if one is angry in accordance with right reason, one's anger is deserving of praise.
Reply Obj. 1: The Stoics designated anger and all the other pa.s.sions as emotions opposed to the order of reason; and accordingly they deemed anger and all other pa.s.sions to be evil, as stated above (I-II, Q. 24, A. 2) when we were treating of the pa.s.sions. It is in this sense that Jerome considers anger; for he speaks of the anger whereby one is angry with one's neighbor, with the intent of doing him a wrong.--But, according to the Peripatetics, to whose opinion Augustine inclines (De Civ. Dei ix, 4), anger and the other pa.s.sions of the soul are movements of the sensitive appet.i.te, whether they be moderated or not, according to reason: and in this sense anger is not always evil.
Reply Obj. 2: Anger may stand in a twofold relation to reason. First, antecedently; in this way it withdraws reason from its rect.i.tude, and has therefore the character of evil. Secondly, consequently, inasmuch as the movement of the sensitive appet.i.te is directed against vice and in accordance with reason, this anger is good, and is called ”zealous anger.” Wherefore Gregory says (Moral. v, 45): ”We must beware lest, when we use anger as an instrument of virtue, it overrule the mind, and go before it as its mistress, instead of following in reason's train, ever ready, as its handmaid, to obey.”
This latter anger, although it hinder somewhat the judgment of reason in the execution of the act, does not destroy the rect.i.tude of reason. Hence Gregory says (Moral. v, 45) that ”zealous anger troubles the eye of reason, whereas sinful anger blinds it.” Nor is it incompatible with virtue that the deliberation of reason be interrupted in the execution of what reason has deliberated: since art also would be hindered in its act, if it were to deliberate about what has to be done, while having to act.
Reply Obj. 3: It is unlawful to desire vengeance considered as evil to the man who is to be punished, but it is praiseworthy to desire vengeance as a corrective of vice and for the good of justice; and to this the sensitive appet.i.te can tend, in so far as it is moved thereto by the reason: and when revenge is taken in accordance with the order of judgment, it is G.o.d's work, since he who has power to punish ”is G.o.d's minister,” as stated in Rom. 13:4.
Reply Obj. 4: We can and ought to be like to G.o.d in the desire for good; but we cannot be altogether likened to Him in the mode of our desire, since in G.o.d there is no sensitive appet.i.te, as in us, the movement of which has to obey reason. Wherefore Gregory says (Moral.
v, 45) that ”anger is more firmly erect in withstanding vice, when it bows to the command of reason.”
_______________________
SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 158, Art. 2]
Whether Anger Is a Sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that anger is not a sin. For we demerit by sinning. But ”we do not demerit by the pa.s.sions, even as neither do we incur blame thereby,” as stated in _Ethic._ ii, 5. Consequently no pa.s.sion is a sin. Now anger is a pa.s.sion as stated above (I-II, Q.
46, A. 1) in the treatise on the pa.s.sions. Therefore anger is not a sin.
Obj. 2: Further, in every sin there is conversion to some mutable good. But in anger there is conversion not to a mutable good, but to a person's evil. Therefore anger is not a sin.
Obj. 3: Further, ”No man sins in what he cannot avoid,” as Augustine a.s.serts [*De Lib. Arb. iii, 18]. But man cannot avoid anger, for a gloss on Ps. 4:5, ”Be ye angry and sin not,” says: ”The movement of anger is not in our power.” Again, the Philosopher a.s.serts (Ethic.
vii, 6) that ”the angry man acts with displeasure.” Now displeasure is contrary to the will. Therefore anger is not a sin.
Obj. 4: Further, sin is contrary to nature, according to Damascene [*De Fide Orth. ii, 4, 30]. But it is not contrary to man's nature to be angry, and it is the natural act of a power, namely the irascible; wherefore Jerome says in a letter [*Ep. xii ad Anton. Monach.] that ”to be angry is the property of man.” Therefore it is not a sin to be angry.
_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Eph. 4:31): ”Let all indignation and anger [*Vulg.: 'Anger and indignation'] ... be put away from you.”
_I answer that,_ Anger, as stated above (A. 1), is properly the name of a pa.s.sion. A pa.s.sion of the sensitive appet.i.te is good in so far as it is regulated by reason, whereas it is evil if it set the order of reason aside. Now the order of reason, in regard to anger, may be considered in relation to two things. First, in relation to the appetible object to which anger tends, and that is revenge. Wherefore if one desire revenge to be taken in accordance with the order of reason, the desire of anger is praiseworthy, and is called ”zealous anger” [*Cf. Greg., Moral. v, 45]. On the other hand, if one desire the taking of vengeance in any way whatever contrary to the order of reason, for instance if he desire the punishment of one who has not deserved it, or beyond his deserts, or again contrary to the order prescribed by law, or not for the due end, namely the maintaining of justice and the correction of defaults, then the desire of anger will be sinful, and this is called sinful anger.
Secondly, the order of reason in regard to anger may be considered in relation to the mode of being angry, namely that the movement of anger should not be immoderately fierce, neither internally nor externally; and if this condition be disregarded, anger will not lack sin, even though just vengeance be desired.
Reply Obj. 1: Since pa.s.sion may be either regulated or not regulated by reason, it follows that a pa.s.sion considered absolutely does not include the notion of merit or demerit, of praise or blame. But as regulated by reason, it may be something meritorious and deserving of praise; while on the other hand, as not regulated by reason, it may be demeritorious and blameworthy. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 5) that ”it is he who is angry in a certain way, that is praised or blamed.”
Reply Obj. 2: The angry man desires the evil of another, not for its own sake but for the sake of revenge, towards which his appet.i.te turns as to a mutable good.
Reply Obj. 3: Man is master of his actions through the judgment of his reason, wherefore as to the movements that forestall that judgment, it is not in man's power to prevent them as a whole, i.e.
so that none of them arise, although his reason is able to check each one, if it arise. Accordingly it is stated that the movement of anger is not in man's power, to the extent namely that no such movement arise. Yet since this movement is somewhat in his power, it is not entirely sinless if it be inordinate. The statement of the Philosopher that ”the angry man acts with displeasure,” means that he is displeased, not with his being angry, but with the injury which he deems done to himself: and through this displeasure he is moved to seek vengeance.
Reply Obj. 4: The irascible power in man is naturally subject to his reason, wherefore its act is natural to man, in so far as it is in accord with reason, and in so far as it is against reason, it is contrary to man's nature.
_______________________
THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 158, Art. 3]