Part III (Secunda Secundae) Part 230 (2/2)

Whether Six Daughters Are Fittingly a.s.signed to Anger?

Objection 1: It would seem that six daughters are unfittingly a.s.signed to anger, namely ”quarreling, swelling of the mind, contumely, clamor, indignation and blasphemy.” For blasphemy is reckoned by Isidore [*QQ. in Deut., qu. xvi] to be a daughter of pride. Therefore it should not be accounted a daughter of anger.

Obj. 2: Further, hatred is born of anger, as Augustine says in his rule (Ep. ccxi). Therefore it should be placed among the daughters of anger.

Obj. 3: Further, ”a swollen mind” would seem to be the same as pride.

Now pride is not the daughter of a vice, but ”the mother of all vices,” as Gregory states (Moral. x.x.xi, 45). Therefore swelling of the mind should not be reckoned among the daughters of anger.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory (Moral. x.x.xi, 45) a.s.signs these daughters to anger.

_I answer that,_ Anger may be considered in three ways. First, as consisting in thought, and thus two vices arise from anger. One is on the part of the person with whom a man is angry, and whom he deems unworthy (_indignum_) of acting thus towards him, and this is called ”indignation.” The other vice is on the part of the man himself, in so far as he devises various means of vengeance, and with such like thoughts fills his mind, according to Job 15:2, ”Will a wise man ... fill his stomach with burning heat?” And thus we have ”swelling of the mind.”

Secondly, anger may be considered, as expressed in words: and thus a twofold disorder arises from anger. One is when a man manifests his anger in his manner of speech, as stated above (A. 5, ad 3) of the man who says to his brother, ”Raca”: and this refers to ”clamor,”

which denotes disorderly and confused speech. The other disorder is when a man breaks out into injurious words, and if these be against G.o.d, it is ”blasphemy,” if against one's neighbor, it is ”contumely.”

Thirdly, anger may be considered as proceeding to deeds; and thus anger gives rise to ”quarrels,” by which we are to understand all manner of injuries inflicted on one's neighbor through anger.

Reply Obj. 1: The blasphemy into which a man breaks out deliberately proceeds from pride, whereby a man lifts himself up against G.o.d: since, according to Ecclus. 10:14, ”the beginning of the pride of man is to fall off from G.o.d,” i.e. to fall away from reverence for Him is the first part of pride [*Cf. Q. 162, A. 7, ad 2]; and this gives rise to blasphemy. But the blasphemy into which a man breaks out through a disturbance of the mind, proceeds from anger.

Reply Obj. 2: Although hatred sometimes arises from anger, it has a previous cause, from which it arises more directly, namely displeasure, even as, on the other hand, love is born of pleasure.

Now through displeasure, a man is moved sometimes to anger, sometimes to hatred. Wherefore it was fitting to reckon that hatred arises from sloth rather than from anger.

Reply Obj. 3: Swelling of the mind is not taken here as identical with pride, but for a certain effort or daring attempt to take vengeance; and daring is a vice opposed to fort.i.tude.

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EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 158, Art. 8]

Whether There Is a Vice Opposed to Anger Resulting from Lack of Anger?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is not a vice opposed to anger, resulting from lack of anger. For no vice makes us like to G.o.d. Now by being entirely without anger, a man becomes like to G.o.d, Who judges ”with tranquillity” (Wis. 12:18). Therefore seemingly it is not a vice to be altogether without anger.

Obj. 2: Further, it is not a vice to lack what is altogether useless.

But the movement of anger is useful for no purpose, as Seneca proves in the book he wrote on anger (De Ira i, 9, seqq.). Therefore it seems that lack of anger is not a vice.

Obj. 3: Further, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv), ”man's evil is to be without reason.” Now the judgment of reason remains unimpaired, if all movement of anger be done away. Therefore no lack of anger amounts to a vice.

_On the contrary,_ Chrysostom [*Hom. xi in Matth. in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says: ”He who is not angry, whereas he has cause to be, sins. For unreasonable patience is the hotbed of many vices, it fosters negligence, and incites not only the wicked but even the good to do wrong.”

_I answer that,_ Anger may be understood in two ways. In one way, as a simple movement of the will, whereby one inflicts punishment, not through pa.s.sion, but in virtue of a judgment of the reason: and thus without doubt lack of anger is a sin. This is the sense in which anger is taken in the saying of Chrysostom, for he says (Hom. xi in Matth., in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom): ”Anger, when it has a cause, is not anger but judgment.

For anger, properly speaking, denotes a movement of pa.s.sion”: and when a man is angry with reason, his anger is no longer from pa.s.sion: wherefore he is said to judge, not to be angry. In another way anger is taken for a movement of the sensitive appet.i.te, which is with pa.s.sion resulting from a bodily trans.m.u.tation. This movement is a necessary sequel, in man, to the movement of his will, since the lower appet.i.te necessarily follows the movement of the higher appet.i.te, unless there be an obstacle. Hence the movement of anger in the sensitive appet.i.te cannot be lacking altogether, unless the movement of the will be altogether lacking or weak. Consequently lack of the pa.s.sion of anger is also a vice, even as the lack of movement in the will directed to punishment by the judgment of reason.

Reply Obj. 1: He that is entirely without anger when he ought to be angry, imitates G.o.d as to lack of pa.s.sion, but not as to G.o.d's punis.h.i.+ng by judgment.

Reply Obj. 2: The pa.s.sion of anger, like all other movements of the sensitive appet.i.te, is useful, as being conducive to the more prompt execution [*Cf. I-II, Q. 24, A. 3] of reason's dictate: else, the sensitive appet.i.te in man would be to no purpose, whereas ”nature does nothing without purpose” [*Aristotle, De Coelo i, 4].

Reply Obj. 3: When a man acts inordinately, the judgment of his reason is cause not only of the simple movement of the will but also of the pa.s.sion in the sensitive appet.i.te, as stated above. Wherefore just as the removal of the effect is a sign that the cause is removed, so the lack of anger is a sign that the judgment of reason is lacking.

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