Part III (Secunda Secundae) Part 230 (1/2)
Whether the Philosopher Suitably a.s.signs the Species of Anger?
Objection 1: It would seem that the species of anger are unsuitably a.s.signed by the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 5) where he says that some angry persons are ”choleric,” some ”sullen,” and some ”ill-tempered”
or ”stern.” According to him, a person is said to be ”sullen” whose anger ”is appeased with difficulty and endures a long time.” But this apparently pertains to the circ.u.mstance of time. Therefore it seems that anger can be differentiated specifically in respect also of the other circ.u.mstances.
Obj. 2: Further, he says (Ethic. iv, 5) that ”ill-tempered” or ”stern” persons ”are those whose anger is not appeased without revenge, or punishment.” Now this also pertains to the unquenchableness of anger. Therefore seemingly the ill-tempered is the same as bitterness.
Obj. 3: Further, our Lord mentions three degrees of anger, when He says (Matt. 5:22): ”Whosoever is angry with his brother, shall be in danger of the judgment: and whosoever shall say to his brother, Raca, shall be in danger of the council, and whosoever shall say” to his brother, ”Thou fool.” But these degrees are not referable to the aforesaid species. Therefore it seems that the above division of anger is not fitting.
_On the contrary,_ Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxi]
says ”there are three species of irascibility,” namely, ”the anger which is called wrath [*_Fellea,_ i.e. like gall. But in I-II, Q.
46, A. 8, St. Thomas quoting the same authority has _Cholos_ which we render 'wrath'],” and ”ill-will” which is a disease of the mind, and ”rancour.” Now these three seem to coincide with the three aforesaid.
For ”wrath” he describes as ”having beginning and movement,” and the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 5) ascribes this to ”choleric” persons: ”ill-will” he describes as ”an anger that endures and grows old,” and this the Philosopher ascribes to ”sullenness”; while he describes ”rancour” as ”reckoning the time for vengeance,” which tallies with the Philosopher's description of the ”ill-tempered.” The same division is given by Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 16). Therefore the aforesaid division a.s.signed by the Philosopher is not unfitting.
_I answer that,_ The aforesaid distinction may be referred either to the pa.s.sion, or to the sin itself of anger. We have already stated when treating of the pa.s.sions (I-II, Q. 46, A. 8) how it is to be applied to the pa.s.sion of anger. And it would seem that this is chiefly what Gregory of Nyssa and Damascene had in view. Here, however, we have to take the distinction of these species in its application to the sin of anger, and as set down by the Philosopher.
For the inordinateness of anger may be considered in relation to two things. First, in relation to the origin of anger, and this regards ”choleric” persons, who are angry too quickly and for any slight cause. Secondly, in relation to the duration of anger, for that anger endures too long; and this may happen in two ways. In one way, because the cause of anger, to wit, the inflicted injury, remains too long in a man's memory, the result being that it gives rise to a lasting displeasure, wherefore he is ”grievous” and ”sullen” to himself. In another way, it happens on the part of vengeance, which a man seeks with a stubborn desire: this applies to ”ill-tempered” or ”stern” people, who do not put aside their anger until they have inflicted punishment.
Reply Obj. 1: It is not time, but a man's propensity to anger, or his pertinacity in anger, that is the chief point of consideration in the aforesaid species.
Reply Obj. 2: Both ”sullen” and ”ill-tempered” people have a long-lasting anger, but for different reasons. For a ”sullen” person has an abiding anger on account of an abiding displeasure, which he holds locked in his breast; and as he does not break forth into the outward signs of anger, others cannot reason him out of it, nor does he of his own accord lay aside his anger, except his displeasure wear away with time and thus his anger cease. On the other hand, the anger of ”ill-tempered” persons is long-lasting on account of their intense desire for revenge, so that it does not wear out with time, and can be quelled only by revenge.
Reply Obj. 3: The degrees of anger mentioned by our Lord do not refer to the different species of anger, but correspond to the course of the human act [*Cf. I-II, Q. 46, A. 8, Obj. 3]. For the first degree is an inward conception, and in reference to this He says: ”Whosoever is angry with his brother.” The second degree is when the anger is manifested by outward signs, even before it breaks out into effect; and in reference to this He says: ”Whosoever shall say to his brother, Raca!” which is an angry exclamation. The third degree is when the sin conceived inwardly breaks out into effect. Now the effect of anger is another's hurt under the aspect of revenge; and the least of hurts is that which is done by a mere word; wherefore in reference to this He says: ”Whosoever shall say to his brother Thou fool!” Consequently it is clear that the second adds to the first, and the third to both the others; so that, if the first is a mortal sin, in the case referred to by our Lord, as stated above (A. 3, ad 2), much more so are the others. Wherefore some kind of condemnation is a.s.signed as corresponding to each one of them. In the first case ”judgment” is a.s.signed, and this is the least severe, for as Augustine says [*Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 9], ”where judgment is to be delivered, there is an opportunity for defense”: in the second case ”council” is a.s.signed, ”whereby the judges deliberate together on the punishment to be inflicted”: to the third case is a.s.signed ”h.e.l.l-fire,” i.e. ”decisive condemnation.”
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SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 158, Art. 6]
Whether Anger Should Be Reckoned Among the Capital Vices?
Objection 1: It would seem that anger should not be reckoned among the capital sins. For anger is born of sorrow which is a capital vice known by the name of sloth. Therefore anger should not be reckoned a capital vice.
Obj. 2: Further, hatred is a graver sin than anger. Therefore it should be reckoned a capital vice rather than anger.
Obj. 3: Further, a gloss on Prov. 29:22, ”An angry [Douay: 'pa.s.sionate'] man provoketh quarrels,” says: ”Anger is the door to all vices: if it be closed, peace is ensured within to all the virtues; if it be opened, the soul is armed for every crime.” Now no capital vice is the origin of all sins, but only of certain definite ones. Therefore anger should not be reckoned among the capital vices.
_On the contrary,_ Gregory (Moral. x.x.xi, 45) places anger among the capital vices.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 84, A. 3, 4), a capital vice is defined as one from which many vices arise. Now there are two reasons for which many vices can arise from anger. The first is on the part of its object which has much of the aspect of desirability, in so far as revenge is desired under the aspect of just or honest*, which is attractive by its excellence, as stated above (A. 4).
[*Honesty must be taken here in its broad sense as synonymous with moral goodness, from the point of view of decorum; Cf. Q. 145, A. 1.]
The second is on the part of its impetuosity, whereby it precipitates the mind into all kinds of inordinate action. Therefore it is evident that anger is a capital vice.
Reply Obj. 1: The sorrow whence anger arises is not, for the most part, the vice of sloth, but the pa.s.sion of sorrow, which results from an injury inflicted.
Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q. 118, A. 7; Q. 148, A. 5; Q. 153, A.
4; I-II, Q. 84, A. 4), it belongs to the notion of a capital vice to have a most desirable end, so that many sins are committed through the desire thereof. Now anger, which desires evil under the aspect of good, has a more desirable end than hatred has, since the latter desires evil under the aspect of evil: wherefore anger is more a capital vice than hatred is.
Reply Obj. 3: Anger is stated to be the door to the vices accidentally, that is by removing obstacles, to wit by hindering the judgment of reason, whereby man is withdrawn from evil. It is, however, directly the cause of certain special sins, which are called its daughters.
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SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 158, Art. 7]