Part IV (Tertia Pars) Part 34 (1/2)

_On the contrary,_ In the decisions of the Sixth Council [*Third Council of Constantinople, Act. 18] it is said: ”We confess two natural wills, not in opposition, as evil-minded heretics a.s.sert, but following His human will, and neither withstanding nor striving against, but rather being subject to, His Divine and omnipotent will.”

_I answer that,_ Contrariety can exist only where there is opposition in the same and as regards the same. For if the diversity exists as regards diverse things, and in diverse subjects, this would not suffice for the nature of contrariety, nor even for the nature of contradiction, e.g. if a man were well formed or healthy as regards his hand, but not as regards his foot. Hence for there to be contrariety of wills in anyone it is necessary, first, that the diversity of wills should regard the same. For if the will of one regards the doing of something with reference to some universal reason, and the will of another regards the not doing the same with reference to some particular reason, there is not complete contrariety of will, e.g. when a judge wishes a brigand to be hanged for the good of the commonwealth, and one of the latter's kindred wishes him not to be hanged on account of a private love, there is no contrariety of wills; unless, indeed, the desire of the private good went so far as to wish to hinder the public good for the private good--in that case the opposition of wills would regard the same.

Secondly, for contrariety of wills it is necessary that it should be in the same will. For if a man wishes one thing with his rational appet.i.te, and wishes another thing with his sensitive appet.i.te, there is no contrariety, unless the sensitive appet.i.te so far prevailed as to change or at least keep back the rational appet.i.te; for in this case something of the contrary movement of the sensitive appet.i.te would reach the rational will.

And hence it must be said that although the natural and the sensitive will in Christ wished what the Divine will did not wish, yet there was no contrariety of wills in Him. First, because neither the natural will nor the will of sensuality rejected the reason for which the Divine will and the will of the human reason in Christ wished the pa.s.sion. For the absolute will of Christ wished the salvation of the human race, although it did not pertain to it to will this for the sake of something further; but the movement of sensuality could nowise extend so far. Secondly, because neither the Divine will nor the will of reason in Christ was impeded or r.e.t.a.r.ded by the natural will or the appet.i.te of sensuality. So, too, on the other hand, neither the Divine will nor the will of reason in Christ shrank from or r.e.t.a.r.ded the movement of the natural human will and the movement of the sensuality in Christ. For it pleased Christ, in His Divine will, and in His will of reason, that His natural will and will of sensuality should be moved according to the order of their nature.

Hence it is clear that in Christ there was no opposition or contrariety of wills.

Reply Obj. 1: The fact of any will in Christ willing something else than did the Divine will, proceeded from the Divine will, by whose permission the human nature in Christ was moved by its proper movements, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 15, 18, 19).

Reply Obj. 2: In us the desires of the spirit are impeded or r.e.t.a.r.ded by the desires of the flesh: this did not occur in Christ. Hence in Christ there was no contrariety of flesh and spirit, as in us.

Reply Obj. 3: The agony in Christ was not in the rational soul, in as far as it implies a struggle in the will arising from a diversity of motives, as when anyone, on his reason considering one, wishes one thing, and on its considering another, wishes the contrary. For this springs from the weakness of the reason, which is unable to judge which is the best simply. Now this did not occur in Christ, since by His reason He judged it best that the Divine will regarding the salvation of the human race should be fulfilled by His pa.s.sion.

Nevertheless, there was an agony in Christ as regards the sensitive part, inasmuch as it implied a dread of coming trial, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 15; iii, 18, 23).

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QUESTION 19

OF THE UNITY OF CHRIST'S OPERATION (In Four Articles)

We must now consider the unity of Christ's operation; and under this head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether in Christ there was one or several operations of the G.o.dhead and Manhood?

(2) Whether in Christ there were several operations of the human nature?

(3) Whether Christ by His human operation merited anything for Himself?

(4) Whether He merited anything for us by it?

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FIRST ARTICLE [III, Q. 19, Art. 1]

Whether in Christ There Is Only One Operation of the G.o.dhead and Manhood?

Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there is but one operation of the G.o.dhead and the Manhood. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii): ”The most loving operation of G.o.d is made manifest to us by the supersubstantial Word having taken flesh integrally and truly, and having operated and suffered whatsoever befits His human and Divine operation.” But he here mentions only one human and Divine operation, which is written in Greek _theandrike_, i.e. G.o.d-manlike. Hence it seems that there is but one composite operation in Christ.

Obj. 2: Further, there is but one operation of the princ.i.p.al and instrumental agent. Now the human nature in Christ was the instrument of the Divine, as was said above (Q. 7, A. 1, ad 3; Q. 8, A. 1, ad 1; Q. 18, A. 1, ad 2). Hence the operations of the Divine and human natures in Christ are the same.

Obj. 3: Further, since in Christ there are two natures in one hypostasis or person, whatever pertains to the hypostasis or person is one and the same. But operation pertains to the hypostasis or person, for it is only a subsisting suppositum that operates; hence, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. i, 1), acts belong to singulars. Hence in Christ there is only one operation of the G.o.dhead and the Manhood.

Obj. 4: Further, as being belongs to a subsisting hypostasis, so also does operation. But on account of the unity of hypostasis there is only one operation of the G.o.dhead and the (Q. 17, A. 2). Hence, on account of the same unity, there is one operation in Christ.

Obj. [5]: Further, [where there is one thing] operated there is one operation. But the same thing was operated by the G.o.dhead and the Manhood, as the healing of the lepers or the raising of the dead.

Hence it seems that in Christ there is but one operation of the G.o.dhead and the Manhood.

_On the contrary,_ Ambrose says (De Fide ii, 8): ”How can the same operation spring from different powers? Cannot the lesser operate as the greater? And can there be one operation where there are different substances?”

_I answer that,_ As was said above (Q. 18, A. 1), the aforesaid heretics who placed one will in Christ placed one operation in Christ. Now in order better to understand their erroneous opinion, we must bear in mind that wherever there are several mutually ordained agents, the inferior is moved by the superior, as in man the body is moved by the soul and the lower powers by the reason. And thus the actions and movements of the inferior principle are things operated rather than operations. Now what pertains to the highest principle is properly the operation; thus we say of man that to walk, which belongs to the feet, and to touch, which belongs to the hand, are things operated by the man--one of which is operated by the soul through the feet, the other through the hands. And because it is the same soul that operates in both cases, there is only one indifferent operation, on the part of the thing operating, which is the first moving principle; but difference is found on the part of what is operated. Now, as in a mere man the body is moved by the soul, and the sensitive by the rational appet.i.te, so in the Lord Jesus Christ the human nature is moved and ruled by the Divine. Hence they said that there is one indifferent operation on the part of the G.o.dhead operating, but divers things operated, inasmuch as the G.o.dhead of Christ did one thing by Itself, as to uphold all things by the word of His power--and another thing by His human nature, as to walk in body. Hence the Sixth Council [*Third Council of Constantinople, Act.

10] quotes the words of Severus the heretic, who said: ”What things were done and wrought by the one Christ, differ greatly; for some are becoming to G.o.d, and some are human, as to walk bodily on the earth is indeed human, but to give hale steps to sickly limbs, wholly unable to walk on the ground, is becoming to G.o.d. Yet one, i.e. the Incarnate Word, wrought one and the other--neither was this from one nature, and that from another; nor can we justly affirm that because there are distinct things operated there are therefore two operating natures and forms.”