Part 9 (1/2)
Though we may accept Hume's conclusion that speechless animals think, believe, and reason; yet, it must be borne in nification of the terms when applied to thee The thoughts of the fors; those of the latter are, in addition, trains of the ideas of the signs which represent feelings, and which are called ”words”
A word, in fact, is a spoken or written sign, the idea of which is, by repetition, so closely associated with the idea of the si which it represents, that the association becolish” without iroup of iroup of i”
The association of words with ie approaches perfection, in proportion as the shades of difference between various ideas and impressions are represented by differences in their naroups of co-existent or successive complex impressions and ideas, considered _per se_, are substantives; as redness, dog, silver, mouth; while the names of impressions or ideas considered as parts or attributes of a complex whole, are adjectives Thus redness, considered as part of the complex idea of a rose, becomes the adjective red; flesh-eater, as part of the idea of a dog, is represented by carnivorous; whiteness, as part of the idea of silver, is white; and so on
The linguistic machinery for the expression of belief is called _predication_; and, as all beliefs express ideas of relation, we n of predication is the verbal sy of relation The words which serve to indicate predication are verbs If I say ”silver” and then ”white,” I merely utter two names; but if I interpose between them the verb ”is,” I express a belief in the co-existence of the feeling of whiteness with the other feelings which constitute the totality of the complex idea of silver; in other words, I predicate ”whiteness” of silver
In such a case as this, the verb expresses predication and nothing else, and is called a copula But, in the great n of a complex idea, and the predication is expressed only by its form Thus in ”silver shi+nes,” the verb ”to shi+ne” is the sign for the feeling of brightness, and the mark of predication lies in the forht about by the forht modifications they are made to indicate that a belief, or predication, is a memory, or is an expectation Thus ”silver _shone_” expresses a memory; ”silver _will_ shi+ne” an expectation
The form of words which expresses a predication is a proposition
Hence, every predication is the verbal equivalent of a belief; and, as every belief is either an immediate consciousness, a memory, or an expectation, and as every expectation is traceable to arun, all propositions express either immediate states of consciousness, or memories The proposition which predicates A of X must mean either, that the fact is testified by my present consciousness, as when I say that two colours, visible at this moment, resemble one another; or that A is indissolubly associated with X in memory; or that A is indissolubly associated with X in expectation But it has already been shown that expectation is only an expression of e, but sohis philosophical tenets, turns upon the value and the origin of verbal propositions, that this su process will probably not be deee an extent of the field of thought is traversed by Hume, in his discussion of the verbal propositions in which mankind enshrine their beliefs, that it would be is of his long journey, within the limits of this essay I purpose, therefore, to limit myself to those propositions which concern--1 Necessary Truths; 2 The Order of Nature; 3 The Soul; 4
Theism; 5 The Passions and Volition; 6 The Principle of Morals
Hu necessary truths, andcausation, have, ive him a prominent place in the history of philosophy
”All the objects of human reason and inquiry may naturally be divided into two kinds, to wit, _relations of ideas_ and _eoebra, and arithmetic, and, in short, every affirmation which is either intuitively or demonstratively certain _That the square of the hypothenuse is equal to the square of the two sides_, is a proposition which expresses a relation between these two figures
_That three times five is equal to the half of thirty_, expresses a relation between these numbers Propositions of this kind are discoverable by the ht without dependence on whatever is anywhere existent in the universe Though there never were a circle or a triangle in nature, the truths demonstrated by Euclid would for ever retain their certainty and evidence
”Matters of fact, which are the second objects of human reason, are not ascertained in the sareat, of a like nature with the foregoing The contrary of every matter of fact is still possible, because it can never imply a contradiction, and is conceived by the mind with the same facility and distinctness, as if ever so conformable to reality _That the sun will not rise to-ible a proposition, and implies no more contradiction, than the affirmation, _that it will rise_ We should in vain, therefore, attempt to demonstrate its falsehood Were it demonstratively false, it would imply a contradiction, and could never be distinctly conceived by the mind”--(IV pp 32, 33)
The distinction here drawn between the truths of geometry and other kinds of truth is far less sharply indicated in the _Treatise_, but as Hume expressly disowns any opinions on these matters but such as are expressed in the _Inquiry_, we may confine ourselves to the latter; and it is needful to look narrowly into the propositions here laid down, as much stress has been laid upon Hume's admission that the truths of mathematics are intuitively and demonstratively certain; in other words, that they are necessary and, in that respect, differ from all other kinds of belief
What is meant by the assertion that ”propositions of this kind are discoverable by the ht without dependence on what is anywhere existent in the universe”?
Suppose that there were no such things as iht and touch anywhere in the universe, what idea could we have even of a straight line, le and of the relations between its sides?
The fundamental proposition of all Hume's philosophy is that ideas are copied from impressions; and, therefore, if there were no iles there could be no ideas of straight lines and triangles But e mean by the universe is the suain, whether our conception of number is derived from relations of impressions in space or in time, the impressions must exist in nature, that is, in experience, before their relations can be perceived Form and number are mere names for certain relations between matters of fact; unless a ht line and a crooked one, straight and crooked would have noto his which are equal to the same are equal to one another, is only a particular case of the predication of similarity; if there were no impressions, it is obvious that there could be no predicates But what is an existence in the universe but an iidly analysed, they will be found to be of two kinds Either they depend on the convention which underlies the possibility of intelligible speech, that ter; or they are propositions the negation of which implies the dissolution of some association in memory or expectation, which is in fact indissoluble; or the denial of some fact of immediate consciousness
The ”necessary truth” A = A means that the perception which is called A shall always be called A The ”necessary truth” that ”two straight lines cannot inclose a space,” means that we have noThe denial of the ”necessary truth” that the thought now in my mind exists, involves the denial of consciousness
To the assertion that the evidence ofas that of relations of ideas, it reat nu but relations of ideas If I say that red is unlike blue, Ia relation of ideas; but it is also matter of fact, and the contrary proposition is inconceivable If I reo, that is matter of fact; and, at the same time, it expresses a relation between the event remembered and the present time It is wholly inconceivable to me that the event did not happen, so thatas that which I have respecting any other necessary truth In fact, the man is either very wise or very virtuous, or very lucky, perhaps all three, who has gone through life without accuive a good deal to be able to disbelieve
It would be beside the mark to discuss the matter further on the present occasion It is sufficient to point out that, whatever may be the differences, between mathematical and other truths, they do not justify Hume's statement And it is, at any rate, iency ofmore than these circumstances; that the experiences hich they are concerned are a the first which arise in the mind; that they are so incessantly repeated as to justify us, according to the ordinary laws of ideation, in expecting that the associations which they form will be of extreme tenacity; while the fact, that the expectations based upon the theether
Thus, if the axioms of mathematics are innate, nature would seem to have taken unnecessary trouble; since the ordinary process of association appears to be amply sufficient to confer upon them all the universality and necessity which they actually possess
Whatever needless ad other necessary truths he is quite clear about the axio must have a cause;” whether and in what sense it is a necessary truth; and, that question being decided, whence it is derived